RATANSINH DALSUKHHAI NAYAK versus STATE OF GUJARAT

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 1030 · Decided: 29-10-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DORAISWAMY RAJU · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

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RAT ANSINH DALSUKHHAI NAY AK 
v, 
STATE OF GUJARAT 
OCTOBER 29, 2003 
[DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] 
Evidence Act, 1972--Section 118~hild witness~onviction on the 
basis of evidence of child witness~onviction upheld by High Court-
Held, no particular age prescribed as a determinative factor of the 
C competence of witness-All persons are competent to testify unless court 
finds to the contrary-Child of tender age may testify 'if possesses 
intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers-
Trial Court analysed and examined evidence and the capacity of the child 
witness to understand~ourts be/Ow justified in placing reliance on the 
D testimony which was supported by forensic reports-Penal Code, 1860-
Section 302. 
A child of tender age witnessed murderous assaults by the 
appellant. Inve~tigation began after the father of the child lodged 
information. That appellant was 'Charged under 8_ection 302 of the 
E Indian Penal Code, 1860. The trial court convicted the appellant 
relying upon the evidence· of the child witness and sentenced him to 
undergo life imprisonment, which was confirmed by the High Court. 
Hence this appeal. 
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The appellant contended that evidence ofa child witness ought 
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not to be accepted unless it is totally unblemished and corroborated; 
that where the court finds traces of tutoring, corroboration is a must 
before the evidence is acted upon; and that tutoring was obvious as the 
deceased, informant.and the child witness were closely·related. 
The respondent -contended that there . was no . relationship as 
pointed out by the appellant; that there was no tutoring; and that the 
evidence. when considered in the background of the recoveries and 
forensic report left no scope for any infirmity. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
1030 
' ... 
R.D. NAYAK v. STATE 
1031 
HELD : 1. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not prescribe any A 
particular age as a determinative factor to treat to be a competent one. 
On the contrary, Section 118 of the Act envisages that all persons shall 
be competent to· testify, unless the Court considers that they are 
prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from 
giving rational answers to questions, because of tender years, extreme, B 
old age, disease - whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. 
A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual 
capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. 
The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; 
but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close 
scrutiny and only on being conviNced about the quality and reliability C 
thereof can record convction, based thereon. (1034-A-E) 
Arbind Singh v. State of Bihar, (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 416; Surya 
Narayan v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 1 Supreme 1 and Dattu Ramrao 
Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, [1997] 5 sec 341, relied on. 
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Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, referred to. 
2. The decision on the question whether the child witness has 
sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices E 
his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the 
said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose 
his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the 
obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, t.owever, be 
disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, 
it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary 
because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a 
world of make beliefs. Child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they 
are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaked and moulded, but 
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it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their 
evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of G 
truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of 
a child witness. [1035-B-D] 
3. The trial court elaborately analysed the evidence of the 
eyewitness. There is no reason as to why she would falsely implicate H 
1032 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A the accused. Nothing has been brought on record to show that she or 
her father had any animosity so far the accused is concerned. The 
prosecution has been able to bring ~ome is accusations beyond shadow 
of doubt. The trial court on careful examination was

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