RASHTRIYA CHINI MILLS ADHIKARI PARISHAD, LUCKNOW versus THE STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS
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~- RASHTRIYA CHIN! MILLS ADHIKARI PARISHAD, LUCKNOW A v. THE STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS JULY 2, 1995 B [KULDIP SINGH AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] Constitution of btdic~Article 226(2)-Higlt Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948-Clause 14 proviso-Territorial jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench-'' In respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh ''-Meaning . C of-Cause of action-W/1ether relevant-Civil Procedure Code 1908--Section 141 F.xplanatioit-Effect of By a Government order dated 4.2.1956 read with Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879, twelve districts were brought under the jurisdiction of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner Oudh at Lucknow. In 1925, the Chief Court D of Oudb was established replacing the Court of the Judicial CommisΒ· sloner. In 1948, the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 was made by the Governor General, amalgamating the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh with effect from 26.7.1948. Clause 14 of the said High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 provided for the place or sitting of the Judges of the High Court. The first proviso to clause 14 provided that E unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice otherwise directs, atleast two of the Judges of the High Court shall sit at Lucknow in order to exerdse the jurisdiction and power of the High Court "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh" as the Chief Justice may direct. F The phrase "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh' as appearing in clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order of 1948 was interpreted by this Court in the case of Nasiruddin v. STA Trib1mal, AIR (1976) SC 333 where in this Court held that jurisdiction of the Bench would depend upon the place where the cause ofaction arose. This Court held that if the G cause of action arose wholly within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the matter. However, ir the cause of action arose partly within the specified Oudh areas and partly outside the area, it would be open to the litigant to choose the Bench of his convenience. While deciding the aforesaid case, this Court did not H 733 734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. A refer to or notice the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. B c The petitioner, who are aggrieved by an order of the Government of Uttar Pradesh at Lucknow to sell six sugar factories, challenged the order of the Government by way of a writ petition before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court. Out of the six factories sought to be sold by the impugned order of the Government, only one factory was located within the Ondh area. A Division Bench of the High Court by its .iudgment and order dated 23.9.1994 held that the Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench distinguished the phrase "cause of action" from "exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting" and held that "cause of action" would apply only in cases of controversies. pertaining to the territorial jurisdiction of two different High Courts whereas in cases where the controversy pertains to the exercise of jurisdiction of one High Court, "exercise of jurisdiction revolv- ing on the place of sitting" comes into play. The Division Bench further held that the interpretation given~~o clause 14 of the Amalgamation order D of 1948 in Nasimddi11's case had ceaSJ,d to be operative after 1.2.1977 when the explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure came into force and Sections 15 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure were made E F inapplicable to writ jurisdiction. Against the judgment and order of the Division Bench, the petitioner preferred a Special Leave Petition before this Court. In the meanwhile, the same question of law was considered by a Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad and by its judgment and order dated 15.11.1994, the Full Bench overruled the judgment and order of the Division Bench on the ground that it was contrary to the judgment of this Court in Nasi1uddi11's case. As the impugned judgment of the Division Bench had already been overruled by the Full Bench this Court, on 2.12.1994 disposed of the Special Leave Petition as infructuous. As the Registry of the High Court was being asked to comply with G the "General Directions" given by the Division Bench, the High Court filed an interlocutory application before this Court in the a
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