RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH versus THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 206 · Decided: 07-04-1955 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BIJAN KUMAR MUKHERJEA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

19S5 
Raf .Kali }(11er 
•• 
Ram Ratu1n 
Pa11dey 
Jagannadhadas.J. 
1555 
April 7 
206 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1955] 
that tht: claim of the plantiff-appellant is made out 
and that she is entitled to succeed. 
The:: discussion above. is more germane to the case 
·of a public t«mple wherein the idol has been Shastri-
cally installed and consecrated and the worship is in 
accordance with the Shastras. There is nothing on 
the record to shbw whether the temple in this case 
falls within this category. If; however, the temple 
~s a private one or idol therein is not one Shastri· 
cal!y consecrated, the case in favour of the plaintiff 
is much stronger and her right cannot be seriotisly 
challenged. 
At this stage, it is desirable to mention 
one other matter. 
In the present case the 
emolu-
ments attached to the office ar.e stated to be the daily 
and other offerings made to the deity at the worship 
hy the visiting devotees. 
Both the parties to thi~ 
case have come up to Court on the common footing 
that it is this which constitutes the emoluments. 
Whether and how far such votive offerings can be 
appropriated by a Pujari for his emoluments if the 
temple is a public 
institution, 
(i.e., not a private 
famiiy temple) and whether any usage i'l this behalf 
is valid is a matter which does not arise before us in 
this case. 
In the result, the appeal must be allowed with costs 
throughout and the decree of the trial court must he 
restored. 
RAO SHIVA BAHADUR SINGH 
v. 
THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH AND 
ANOTHER 
fMUKHERJEA C.J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE, STNHA 
and IMAM J.T.] 
. 
Constitution of India-Art. 145(3)-Cottstruction of-Supreme 
Court-Whether competent to split Up the case for ~he purpose of 
hearing and decision. 
Held (Per MUKHERJEA C:T, DAS, VIVIAN HOSE. and IMAM .TJ 
SINHA J. dissentini:) that a Constitution Bench of five or more 
Judges before which a cace happrns to be posted in the first. instance 
2S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
207 
is competent to split up the case by deciding the constitutional ques-
tions and leaving the rest of the case to be dealt with ai:id disposecl 
of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges on merits in con-
formity with the opinion of the Constitution Bench. 
The splitting up of cases in~o different stages fol' hearing and 
decision is not repugnant to the Constitution or the general princi-
ples of procedural law. The underlying principle of the Constitution 
is clear and all that it insists upon is that all Constitution questions 
should be heard and decided by a Bench of not less than five 
Judges. 
As long as this 
requirement 
is 
fulfilled 
there 
can 
be no constitutional objection to the rest of the case being disposed 
of by a Division Bench of less than five Judges, so as to saYe the 
time of the Constitution Bench of five or more Judges. 
There is no general rule of indivisibility of a case for the pur-
pose of its hearing and decision : vide proviso to Article 145(3) and 
Article 228 of the Constitution, s. 24' and Order 18, Rule 15 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure and ss. · 350, 526, 528 and 556 of the Cod'! 
of Criminal Procedure. 
Article 145(3) of the Constitu:ion cannot be so construed as to 
deprive the Supreme Court of the. inherent power of splitting up a 
case for the purpose of hearing and decision. 
Per SINHA J.-The Constitution while laying. down clause (3) 
of Article 145, contemplates the whole matter in controversy arising 
in a 1.:a,e, which may include substantial questions of law as to the 
interpretation of the Coastitution as also other questions. The 
main clause (3), excepting cases coming wjthin the purview of the 
proviso, d<'cs not contemplate a splitting up of a case into parts, one 
part involving substantial questions of law as to the interpretation 
oF the Cons;itution and another part .or parts not involving such 
questions. 
The language ot dausc (3) of Article 145 does not warrant the 
hearing of a case. pie(:cmeal by different Benches unless it comes 
within the purview. of the proviso. The proviso is meant to cover 
onlv a limit('d class of cases which otherwise would have come with-
in the purview of the main clause (3). But the proviso c~nnot have 
a larger effect than is justified by its language. viz., that only a ques-
tion of that description has to be referred for the opinion. of the 
larger Bench. the case itself remaining on the file of the smaller 
Bench. The proviso th.tis makes a clear distinction between a "case'

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