RAO NIHALKARAN versus RAMGOPAL
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A B c D ' E F G H RAO NIHALKARAN v. RAMGOPAL January 27, 1966 [P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C. SHAH, S. M. SIKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (20 of 1959), ss. 185(1)(ii)(a) 261 and 262(2)-Tenant, if includes a person whose tenancy has been teY.. minated at the contmencement of Code-Tenant against whom ejectmen'I proceedings had commenced at the commencement of the Code-If could claim to be anΒ· occupancy tenant. The appellant (holder of an inam in Madhya Pradesh) served a notico on his tenant, the respondent, terminating the tenancy on the ground that he wanted the land for personal cultivation and filed a suit for ejectment. The trial court decreed the suit. During the pendency of the appeal in the District Court, Art. 32 of 1954 was enacted, and pursuant to its proVJSions the hearing of the appeal was stayed. After the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code came into force in 1959, the District Court held that by virtue of s. 185 of that Code the respondent acquired the rights of an occupancy tenant and dismissed the suit. 'The High Court conllrml<t the judgment of the District Court. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (i) the rights of an occupancy tenant arise in favour of a person under s. 185(1)(i)(a) only if there was between him and the landlord a subsisting tenancy at the date when the Code came into force and since under the law in force before the commencement of the Code, the respondent had ceased to be a tenant because of the notice terminating the contract of tenancy the respondent was not invested with the rights of an occupany tenant; and (ii) by virtue of ss. 261 and 262(2), the operation of s. 185 is expressly excluded when a person, against whom ejectment proceedings have been instituted prior to the commencement of the Code in enforcement of a right then acquired. claims the status of an occupancy tenant. HELD : (i) The respondent acquired the right of an occupancy tenant under the Code, because the expression "tenant" in s. 185 (I) (ii) (a) in- cludes a person whose tenancy was terminated before the commencement of the Code. The definition of the expression "tenant" in the Code postulates a sub- sisting tenancy, but the position of a tenant prior to the date on which the Code was brought into force is not dealt with in the definition. In tho cootext in which the expression "tenant" occurs in s. 185(1), that defini- tion could not be intended to apply in determining the conditions which invest a holder of land with the status of an occupancy tenant at the commencement of the Code. Therefore having regard to the object of the enactment the expression should be ascribed the meaning it has in Act 32 of 1954. Under ss. 3 & 4 of that Act a person who was inducted into the land as a tenant and who continued to hold the land at the commencement of the Act was. entitled to protection against evictipn and continue as tenant, notwithstanding that under the law in force prior to the commencement of the Act, the contractual relationship of landford and tenant was determined. [432 D; 432 H-433 CJ 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1966] 3 S.C.R. There is no reason to think that the Legislature sought to make a distinction between tenants of lnam land in s. I 85(1 )(ii)(a) and ryotwari sub-lessees of other lands ins. J85(1)(ii)(b). Therefore, if the expres- sioo "ryotwari sub-lessee" ins. 185(1)(ii)(b) includes a sub-lessee whose tenaure was terminated before tbe commencement of the Code, a tenant of inam land, whose tenancy has been terminated would also be inchided in the protection, provided at some time prior to the date on which the Code was brought into force, he was in poso;ession of the land as a tenant, and he continued to hold the land till the date of the commence- ment of the Code. [434 E-Hl (ii) The provision> of the Code appeol lo tenants in proceedings for ejectment pending at the commencement of the Code. The provi>o to s. 261 protects a right which had been acquired under a law repeated by the Code and the right could be enforced as if the Code A B had not been passed. But the right to evict a tenant was governed by c the general law of landlord and tenant and was not acquired under any repealed law. The proviso had no operation and a legal proceeding pend- ing at the date of the commencement of the Code will be disposed of according to the law enacted in the Code. Theref
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