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RAO NIHALKARAN versus RAMGOPAL

Citation: [1966] 3 S.C.R. 427 · Decided: 27-01-1966 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
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E 
F 
G 
H 
RAO NIHALKARAN 
v. 
RAMGOPAL 
January 27, 1966 
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, J. C. SHAH, 
S. M. SIKRI AND V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.] 
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (20 of 1959), ss. 185(1)(ii)(a) 
261 and 262(2)-Tenant, if includes a person whose tenancy has been teY.. 
minated at the contmencement of Code-Tenant against whom ejectmen'I 
proceedings had commenced at the commencement of the Code-If could 
claim to be anΒ· occupancy tenant. 
The appellant (holder of an inam in Madhya Pradesh) served a notico 
on his tenant, the respondent, terminating the tenancy on the ground that 
he wanted the land for personal cultivation and filed a suit for ejectment. 
The trial court decreed the suit. During the pendency of the appeal in 
the District Court, Art. 32 of 1954 was enacted, and pursuant to its 
proVJSions the hearing of the appeal was stayed. After the Madhya Pradesh 
Land Revenue Code came into force in 1959, the District Court held 
that by virtue of s. 185 of that Code the respondent acquired the rights 
of an occupancy tenant and dismissed the suit. 'The High Court conllrml<t 
the judgment of the District Court. 
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (i) the rights of an 
occupancy tenant arise in favour of a person under s. 185(1)(i)(a) only 
if there was between him and the landlord a subsisting tenancy at the date 
when the Code came into force and since under the law in force before 
the commencement of the Code, the respondent had ceased to be a tenant 
because of the notice terminating the contract of tenancy the respondent 
was not invested with the rights of an occupany tenant; and (ii) by virtue 
of ss. 261 and 262(2), the operation of s. 185 is expressly excluded when a 
person, against whom ejectment proceedings have been instituted prior 
to the commencement of the Code in enforcement of a right then acquired. 
claims the status of an occupancy tenant. 
HELD : (i) The respondent acquired the right of an occupancy tenant 
under the Code, because the expression "tenant" in s. 185 (I) (ii) (a) in-
cludes a person whose tenancy was terminated before the commencement 
of the Code. 
The definition of the expression "tenant" in the Code postulates a sub-
sisting tenancy, but the position of a tenant prior to the date on which the 
Code was brought into force is not dealt with in the definition. In tho 
cootext in which the expression "tenant" occurs in s. 185(1), that defini-
tion could not be intended to apply in determining the conditions which 
invest a holder of land with the status of an occupancy tenant at the 
commencement of the Code. Therefore having regard to the object of 
the enactment the expression should be ascribed the meaning it has in 
Act 32 of 1954. Under ss. 3 & 4 of that Act a person who was inducted 
into the land as a tenant and who continued to hold the land at the 
commencement of the Act was. entitled to protection against evictipn and 
continue as tenant, notwithstanding that under the law in force prior to 
the commencement of the Act, the contractual relationship of landford 
and tenant was determined. 
[432 D; 432 H-433 CJ 
428 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[ 1966] 3 S.C.R. 
There is no reason to think that the Legislature sought to make a 
distinction between tenants of lnam land in s. I 85(1 )(ii)(a) and ryotwari 
sub-lessees of other lands ins. J85(1)(ii)(b). Therefore, if the expres-
sioo "ryotwari sub-lessee" ins. 185(1)(ii)(b) includes a sub-lessee whose 
tenaure was terminated before tbe commencement of the Code, a tenant 
of inam land, whose tenancy has been terminated would also be inchided 
in the protection, provided at some time prior to the date on which the 
Code was brought into force, he was in poso;ession of the land as a 
tenant, and he continued to hold the land till the date of the commence-
ment of the Code. [434 E-Hl 
(ii) The provision> of the Code appeol lo tenants in proceedings for 
ejectment pending at the commencement of the Code. 
The provi>o to s. 261 protects a right which had been acquired under a 
law repeated by the Code and the right could be enforced as if the Code 
A 
B 
had not been passed. 
But the right to evict 
a tenant was governed by c 
the general law of landlord and tenant and 
was not acquired under any 
repealed law. The proviso had no operation and a legal proceeding pend-
ing at the date of the commencement of the Code will be disposed of 
according to the law enacted in the Code. Theref

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