RANVEER YADAV versus STATE OF BIHAR

Citation: [2010] 6 S.C.R. 1073 · Decided: 12-05-2010 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: G.S. SINGHVI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

[2010] 6 S.C.R. 1073 
RANVEER YADAV 
v. 
STATE OF BIHAR 
(Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 2009) 
MAY 12, 2010 
. [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.) 
A 
B 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - ss. 12(1) explanation, 
2(c){ii), 19(1){b) - Contempt of court - Apology in contempt 
proceeding - Held: It must be bonafide and to the satisfaction 
C 
of the court - Apology must be offered at the earliest possible 
opportunity - Belated apology hardly shows contrition which 
is the essence of the purging of a contempt - Court may 
refuse to accept apology though not belated but is without real 
contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a weapon 
D 
of defence - On facts, conviction and sentence of main 
contemnor by High Court for disrupting the court proceedings 
.. which forced the judge to leave, justified - His act is a clear 
case of criminal contempt in the face of the court - In show 
cause notice main contemnor did not offer any apology rather 
E 
tried to justify his act - Apology was offered in a subsequent 
show cause reply which was a belated apology - Supreme 
Court Rules, 1966 - Or. XX/ r. 15 (1)(e). 
F 
BH, BM, PN and MD are accused in a Sessions trial 
case and the appellant was the witness in the case and 
was to be cross-examined. On the fateful day, all of them 
disrupted the proceedings by aggressively exchanging 
heated words and creating unpleasant c:;cenes in court, 
forcing the judge to leave the room.· The Additional 
Sessions Judge made a reference to High Court. The 
G 
High Court treated the same as reference made under 
section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and 
issued show cause notice to the contemnors. It held that 
the appellant was the main person responsible for the 
1073 
H 
1074 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(2010] 6 S q.R 
A disruption, who acted in a motivated and high handed 
manner. The High Court convicted the appellant for the 
contempt of lower court. He was sentenced to a simple 
imprisonment for two months with fine of Rs. 2000/-. The 
High Court accepted the unqualified apology of the other 
B contemnors and let them off. Hence the appeal. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. In the facts of the case aod on the 
materials on record, it is clear that the case of the 
C appellant that in the show-cause notice which was given 
to appellant, no different role has been attributed to him 
and he cannot be treated differently by the High Court in 
the matter of awarding punishment cannot be accepted 
as the appellant's case stands on a different footing. In 
D fact the appellant took the main role in causing disruption 
and there was no lack of opportunity on his part in 
answering the charges against him. The charges put 
against him must be read in a practical sense and cannot 
be read in a pedantic manner. All the constituents of the 
E charges were stated in the show-cause notice and the 
appellant understood the charges and gave the reply. 
Nowhere in the reply the appellant raised any difficulty 
in understanding the charges. It does not appear that any 
contention was raised by the appellant before the High 
F Court about any vagueness in the charges or about 
furnishing inadequate particulars in the charges. This 
argument of the counsel for the appellant only before this 
Court and that too without a proper factual basis cannot 
be entertained. [Para 19] [1081-F-H; 1082-A-B] 
G 
1.2. From the facts of the case it is clear that the 
H 
offending acts of the appellant are specifically coming 
under section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 
Due conduct of any judicial proceeding is a matter of high 
public importance as it is inextricably connected with rule 
RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR 
1075 
of law on which is based the constitutional mode of A 
governance in this country. That is why the framers of the 
Act preceded the expression interfere with the words 
"tends to" and it has been further emphasized by 
addition of word 'due' before "course of any judicial 
proceedings". The legislature does not waste words. 
B 
Therefore, every word used in section 2(c)(ii) must be 
given its proper and natural meaning. Thus read, section 
2(c)(ii) must be given a broad sweep so as to include 
within it even any attempt to interfere with the due course 
of a judicial proceeding. The word 'due' is very crucial in 
C 
thfs context and. must mean a natural and proper course 
of judicial proceeding. [Paras 21 and 22] (1082-F-H; 1083-
A] 
1.3. Section 2(c)(ii)

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.