RANJIT THAKUR versus UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
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A RANJIT THAKUR v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. OCTOBER 15, 1987 B [A.P. SEN AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.] Anny Act, 1950/Army Rules, 1954: Sections 41 and 130/Ru/es 106-133-Court Martial-When proceedings vitiated-Participation of Officer who has punished accused-Whether amounts to bias-- Soldier-Refusing to eat food-Whether amounts to disobedience of C lawful command. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 32, 136 and 226-Judicial Review-Irrationality and perversity-Extent of. Administrative Law: Natural Justice-Fair Trial-Judgment only D after due observance of Judicial Process-Quantum of punishment dis- proportionate to offence-Whether conclusive evidence of bias. E Interpretation of Statutes: Procedural safeguards-Statutory Provisions-How to be construed. The appellant, a Signal Man in a Signal Regiment of the Armed Services, while serving out a sentence of 28 days' rigorous imprison- ment imposed on him by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment- respondent No. 4, for violating norms for presenting representations to higher officers, was alleged to have committed another offence by refus- F ing to eat his food on March 29, 1985 when ordered to o;lo so. He was charged under section 41(2) of the Army Act, 1950 for disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer. A sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year was imposed by a Summary Court Martial consisting of respondent No. 4 and others. He was removed to the civil ' prison aud he served out the sentence. G ' }- The appellant's representation to the confirming authority under section 164 of the Act was rejected by the General Officer Commanding A on May 24, 1985. The appellant's writ petition challenging proceedings of the Sum- H mary Court· Martial was dismissed in limine by the High Court. 512 RANJIT v. U.0.1. 513 ,;._ In the appeal by special leave, it was contended on behalf of the A appellant that the proceedings of the Court-Martial were vitiated (i) by a non-affording of an opportunity to challenge the constitution of the Summary Court-Martial under section 130(1); (ii) by bias on the part of the respondent No. 4 who participated in and dominated the proceed· ings; (iii) by awarding a punishment so disproportionate to the offence B as to amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias and vindictiveness; Y and (iv) by ignoring that as the appellant was then serving-out an earlier sentence he could not be need to be in active-service so as to be amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction and that the appellant's refusal, while already serving a sentence, to accept food did not amount to disobedience under section 41, of any lawful command of a Superior C · Officer . ... / .A Allowing the appeal, HELD: I.I The Indian Army Act, 1950 constitutes a special law in force conferring a special jurisdiction on· the Court· Martial prescrib· Ing a special procedure for the trial of the offences under the Act. The Act and Rules constitute a self-contained Code specifying offences and the procedure for detention, custody and trial of the offenders by the Court· Martial. [518G·H; 519A) 1.2 The procedural safeguards contemplated in the Act must be considered in the context of and corresponding to the plenitude of the Summary jurisdiction of the Court-Martial and the severity of the con· sequences that visit the person subject to that jurisdiction. The pro· cedural safeguards should be commensurate with the sweep of the pow· ers. The wider the power, the greater the need for the restraint in its exercise ad correspondingly, more liberal the construction of the pro· cedural safeguards envisaged by the Statute. [519B·CI D E 1.3 Non-compliance with the mandate of section 130 is an infir· G mity which goes to the root of jurisdiction and without more, vitiates the proceedings. [519F] Prithvi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413 relied on. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 referred to. H A B c D E F G 514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1988] I S.C.R. 2 .1 It is the essence of a judgment that it is made after due obser- vance of the judicial process; that the Court or Tribunal passing it observes, at least the minimal requirements of natural justice, is com- posed of impartial persons acting fairly and without bias and in good faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a nullity and the trial 'coram non-judice'. [520D-E] Vassiliades v. Vassiliades, AIR 19
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