RANJIT SINGH versus UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH & ANR.

Citation: [1991] 3 S.C.R. 742 · Decided: 23-08-1991 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.N. VENKATACHALIAH · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

A 
RANJIT SINGH 
v. 
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH & ANR. 
AUGUST 23, 1991 
B 
(M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, J.S. VERMA AND 
N.D. OJHA, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal P1:ocedure, 1973: Ss. 427, 433A-Life convict 
-Convicted of another murder---,Subsequent sentence of life imprison-
ment-Whether superimposition to the earlier life sentence-Remissions 
c or commutation in respect of earlier sentence-Whether available ipso 
facto in respect of second sentence. 
Indian Penal Code, 1960: S. 302-Life convict-7\<ial for second 
murder-Conviction-Imposition of Life sentence-Whether both life 
sentences to run concurrently. 
D 
Constitution of India: Article 32-0ffender-Separately senten-
ced to life imprisonment for two different offences under section 302 
!PC-Court's direction that in case of remissions or commutation in 
respect of earlier sentence, the latter sentenced to run thereafter-
Interpretation of~Writ Petition challenging the sentence-Whether 
E 
maintainable. 
The petitioner who was convicted under section 302 IPC on 
6.3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment, was also tried for a second 
murder committed while he was on parole after his conviction and 
sentence for the first murder, and was convicted under s. 303 IPC. 
F 
Altering the conviction to one under s. 302 IPC, for the second murder 
this Court sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of death sentence 
and by its judgment dated 30.9. 1983 directed that in case any remission 
and commutation in respect of his eatlier sentence was granted, the 
latter sentence should commence thereafter . 
. G 
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution praying for his release on the ground that both the life 
sentences had to run concurrently in accordance with s. 427(2) Cr. 
P.C., and as he had undergone 14 years sentence of imprisonment with 
remissions at the time of filing the writ petition on February 19, 1990, 
he ·was entitled to be released. It was contended that this Court's direc-
H lion dated 30.9.83 was contrary to s. 427(2) of the Code of Criminal· 
·. 
742 
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4. 
1 
A 
• 
RANJIT SINGH v. U .T. 
743 
Procedure, 1973 since it amounted to directing that the two sentences of 
A 
life imprisonment were to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the direction 
of this Court, properly construed, was not contrary to s. 427(2) Cr. P.C. 
and, therefore, the question of issuing any writ or.directions as claimed 
by the petitioners did not arise. 
Disposing of the petition treating it as one for clarification of the 
judgment dated 30.9.1983 this Court, 
HELD: .l.l A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment 
for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or.impri8onment 
for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural 
life unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the 
appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the 
Court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment 
for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be 
no question of a ·subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for 
life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-s. 
(l) ofs. 427, Cr. P.C. [747G; 749D·E) 
1.2 The earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being under· 
stood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of ore in prison 
unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person 
having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of 
imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life as envisaged by 
s. 427(2) of the Cr. P.C., can only be superimposed to the earlier life 
sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the 
offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. [749F-G) 
It cannot be said that a sentence of life imprisonment is to be 
treated as a sentence of imprisonment for a ftxed term. [748B] 
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1961) 
3 S.C.R. 440 and Maru Ram v. Union of India & Anr., [1981) 1 S.C.R. 
1196, followed." 
2.1 The operation of the superimposed subsequent sentence of life 
imprisonment should no! be wiped out merely because in respect of the 
corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or 
commutation was granted by the appropriate authority. [751F-GJ 
B 
c 
D 
E. 
F 
G 
H 
A 
B 
c 
D 
744 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
I 1991] 3 S.C.R.
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