RAMPRASAD BALMIKI versus ANIL KUMAR JAIN & ORS.

Citation: [2008] 13 S.C.R. 1232 · Decided: 01-10-2008 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 1232 
RAMPRASAD BALMIKI 
v. 
ANIL KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 
(Civil Appeal No. 5949 of 2008) 
OCTOBER 1, 2008 
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.] 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: 
Motor Vehicle accident - Permanent disability - Claim 
C - Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 85, 000/- to the victim - En-
hanced to Rs. 3, 75, 0001- by High Court observing that extent 
of injuries suffered was 40% - Correctness of - Held: Amount 
of compensation should be determined having regard to state 
of affairs as existing on the date of occurrence - In the instant 
D case, claimant suppressed facts before the Tribunal about his · 
premature retirement on account of permanent disability - A 
claim for obtaining 100% compensation in lieu of permanent 
disability must be supported by reasons - But no such mate-
rial has been furnished by the claimant - Doctor, who treated 
E the claimant did not state that he had sustained any perma-
nent disability - Moreover, shortening of leg does not come 
within the purview of permanent total disablement even under 
1923 Act - Under the circumstances, no interference with the 
impugned judgment called for ~ Workmen's Compensation 
F Act, 1923. 
'Total disablement' and 'total permanent disablement' -
Distinction between. 
Appellant was working as a driver with the Canton-
G ment Board. While he was riding on a two-wheeler, a 
Tempo allegedly driven rashly and negligently by respon-
dent No.1 collided with his two-wheeler. Appellant sus-
tained injuries, he was hospitalized and allegedly, under-
went three operations and his right leg got shortened. He 
H 
1232 
RAMPRASAD BALMIKI v. ANIL KUMAR 
1233 · 
JAIN & ORS. 
filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims A 
Tribunal in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 
1988 claiming a sum of Rs. 17.94 lakhs for sustaining per-
manent disability in his right leg and expenses in treat-
ment, etc. Long after the said accident, he was referred to 
the Civil Surgeon, who declared him unfit to drive a ve-
B 
hicle pursuant whereto an order of premature retirement 
from service on medical ground was passed by the au-
thorities. In the meantime, the Tribunal awarded a sum 
of Rs. 85,000/- as compensation. On appeal, the High 
Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs. c 
3,75,000/- opining that even as per the certificate issued 
by the Medical Board, the extent of permanent disability 
suffered by him was 40%. Hence the present appeal. 
Appellant contended that the Tribunal as also the 
High Court have committed a serious error insofar as they D 
failed to take into consideration that 'total disablement' 
would mean 'disablement from doing his job in which he 
was engaged'. 
Respondents submitted that in absence of any stat-
ute or statutory rule or any other material, the functional E 
disability would be the same as loss of earning capacity, 
and in that view of the matter, once the structured for-
mula is applied for the purposes of computing the amount 
of compensation, what is relevant is not only the income 
earned by the appellant but also the extent of purported 
F 
disability suffered by him; and that since the correct mul-
tiplier has been applied, the impugned judgment warrants 
no interference. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 Appellant filed an application in terms of 
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not in terms of 
Section 163A thereof. It is not a case where even the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was applicable. (Para 
- 5) (1239,C] 
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1234 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 
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1.2 The jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal in terms 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
of Section 163A and Section 166 of the Act is different. · 
(Para -- 5) [1239,D] 
Rajesh Kumar@ Raju v. Yudhvir Singh & Anr. (2008) 8 
SCALE 497 - relied on. 
· 
· · 
· 
1.3 Ordinarily, the amount of compensation should 
be dete·rmined having regard to the state of affairs as was 
existing on the date on which the cause of action arose. 
This Court, however, does not mean to lay down a law 
that the subsequent event(s) can never be taken into con-
sideration but it must be placed on record that for the said 
purpose another application would not be maintainable 
subsequently. (Para - 5) [1240,F-G] 
1.4 Appellant in this case is guilty of suppression of 
facts. With a view to obtain a just compensation, he should 
have placed all relevant materials on record. The benefits 
to which he was found to be entitled to pursuant to the 

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