RAMNARAIN versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Citation: [1973] 3 S.C.R. 463 · Decided: 31-01-1973 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: C.A. VAIDYIALINGAM · Disposal: Case Allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
RAMNARAIN 
v. 
STATE OF RAJASTHAN 
January 31, 1973 
[A. ALAG!RISWAMI, I. D. DUA AND C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.] 
Indian Penal Code-Accused convicted under s. 461 
and 
120B-
Applicalion under· s. 561·A of the Cr. P. C. 
not considered-Whether 
there was grave miscarriage of justice. 
The appellant was &llesed to have eintered into a conspiracy 
with 
othero, to persuade membern of the public to part with money 
for 
purchasing residential plots. in a village, 'Khand Gawadi' and in fur-
therence of this conspiracy, they we're alleged to have 
forged 
sale 
proceedings PGttas, and the signatures of othe<rs on such pattas and sale 
proceedings. The appellant himself affixed his signatures as Sarpanch 
and put the seal of the village pancbayat on the 
forged 
documents. 
1he trial court held the appellant guilty of the offences of conspiracy 
under s. 120-B and be was also found guilty of the offences 
under 
s. 467 I. P. C. 
On appeal the High Court confirmed the· appellant's 
cqirviction on both these counts, but reduced bis sentence. The appel-
lant's grievance before this Court was that non-consideration of 
his 
application under s. 561-A Cr. P.C. dated April 7, 1970, which 
was 
filed on May 1, 1970, but neither listed nor heard and !ms resulted in 
grave miscarriage of justice. 
On 18th May 1970, the Hon'ble High 
Court made an order as follows·: "Perused application dated 7·4-1970 
a,nd 30-4-1970. I have decided the case on 17-4-1970 and there 
is, 
therefore, no question of saying anything on the merits 
now". 'Ibe 
second point strongly presented by the appellant is that the appellant's 
conviction was based solely on the testimony of P.W. 1, the approver, 
\Vhose evide:nce has not been corroborated In material part's. 
Allowing the appeal, 
HELD: (i) The application under s. 561-A Cr. P.C. should 
have 
been disposed of after hearing the appellant's counsel and its disposal 
without such hea'ring was clearly \Vrong and unjust. The appellant bas 
a just grievance against the manner in which this application was dis-
posed of. He had a right to be afforded a reasonable opportuuity of 
being heard in support of his application, and the disposal of this case 
in the chamber of the learned judge without giving him such opportunity 
cannot be appreciated [469H] 
(ii) Section 133 of the ~ndian Evidence Act, expressly provides that 
an accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not illegal 
merely because it proceeds on uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice. But this Section has to read along with illustration (b) to s. 114. 
Section 114 empowers the court to presume the existence of 
certaLr1 
facts and the illustrations elucidate what the court may presume. Ilius-
tration (b) in express tertDS says : 'that an accomplice is unworthy of 
credit unless he is corroborated in material 
particulars. The 
statute 
thus p.ermits the conviction of an accused person on the basis of un-
corroborated testimony of a:n accomplice. But the rule 
of prudence 
embodied in Illustration (b) of s. 114 strikes a note of warning that tbe 
court will not generally believe an accomplice unless he is corroborated 
in material parts. 
This rule is guided by long experience and 
has become a rule of prudence for general applic'ation. 
[470C.GJ 
464 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1973] 3 S.C.R. 
(iii) So far as the charge u;nder s: 120-B, I.P.C. is concerned, in 
almost every case of conspiracy, it is generally a matter of inference, 
direct independent evidence being seldom. Inferences 
are 
normally 
deduced from acts of patties in pursuance of apparent crimin"! purpo~e 
in commo;n between them. In the present case, the only evidence is 
of the approver and the trial court expressly observed that there 
is 
no other direct evidence of conspiracy. Therefore the charge of cons-
piracy cannot be sustained from the evidence available. [475G-476B] 
In the pr.esent case, on the existing. evidence, the appellants.' convic· 
tio;ri under s.467 I.P.C. was wholly unsustainable. Therefore, 
the 
appellants' conviction must be set aside. [475FJ 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 
105 of 1970. 
Appeal by special leave from tl!e judgment and order dated 
April 17, 1970 of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in S. B. 
Cr. Appeal No. 283 of 1967. 
Nuruddin Ahmad V. S. Dave and Subhag Mal Jain, for the 
appellant. 
K. Baldev Mehta, for the respQildent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DuA, J.

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