RAMJILAL versus INCOME-TAX OFFICER, MOHINDARGARH
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- RAMJILAL "· INCOME-TAX OFFICER, MOHINDARGARH [SHR1 HARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAzL. Au, PATANJALI SASTRI, MuKHERJEA and DAs JJ.J Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 31 (1), 32, 265-Patiala and East Puniab States Union General Provisions (Administration) Ordinance (XVI of 2005)-Union of States-Law relating to In- come-tax-Uniform law introduced in all States from August 20, 1948-Provision that pending proceedings shall be governed by existing law-Assessment at different rates in different States- Equality of law-Infringement of fundamental right-Assessment t>f income which accrued before August 20, 1948-Legality- Fundamental right not to be deprived of property save under authority of law-Whether applies to taxation-Scope of Arts. 31 (1) and 265-Application under Art. 32 for protection against tax laws-Maintainability. Section 3 (1) of the Patiala ·and East Punjab States Union General Provsions (Administration) Ordinance (No. XVI of 2005) which came into force on February 2, 1949, and re-enacted s. 3 of an earlier Ordinance which was in force from August 20, 1948, provided that as from the appointed day (i.e., August 2Q, 1948) all· laws in force in the Patiala State shall apply mutatis mutandis to the territories of the said Union, provided that all proceedings pending before courts and other authorities of any of the Coven- anting States shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws governing such proceedings in force in such Covenanting State immediately before August 20, 1948. In one of the Covenanting States, viz., Kapurthala, there was a law of income-tax in force on the said date, the rate of tax payable under which was lower than that payable under the Patiala Income-tax Act, and in an- other Covenanting State, Nabha, there was no law of income-tax at all. For the accounting year ending April 12, 1948, assessees of Kapurthala State were assessed at the lower rates fixed by the Kapurthala Income-tax Act, in accordance with the proviso in s. 3 of the Ordinance .relating to pending proceedings, and the asse9- sccs of Nabha were assessed at the higher rates fixed by the Patiala Act as there was no income-tax law in Nabha on August 1951 Jan. 12· 1951 Ramjilal v. Jncamt•tax Officer, Mohit'lt!argarh. 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] 20, 1948, and no income-tax proceedings were therefore pending in Nabha. The petitioner who was an asscssee residing in Nabha and who was assessed under the Patiala Act applied under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari quashing the assessment on the ground (i) that he hlld been denied the fundamental right of equality before the law and equal protec- tion of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution inas- much as he was assessed at a higher rato than that at which asscssces of Kapurthala were assessed, (ii) that, as the Ordinance bringing the Patiala Income-tax Act into force in Nabha was en- acted only on August 20, 1948, it cannot operate retrospectively and authorise the levy of tax on income which had accrued in the year ending April 12, 1948, and therefore he was threatened with infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 31 (1) of the Constitution that no one shall be deprived of his property save under autt.>rity of law : Held, (i) that the discrimination, if any, between the assessecs of Kapurthala and Nabha was not brought about by the Ordinance but by the circumst'Ulcc that there was no incomc·ta.X law in Nab ha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending against any Nabha assessces; and in any case the provision that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceedings commenced, was a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible under the equal protection clause; (ii) that, as there is a special provision in Art. 265 of the Constitution that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law, cl. (1) of Art. 31 must, be regarded as conocrned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or collection of tax, and inasmuch as the right conferred by Art. 265 is not a right conferred by Part III of the Constitution, it could not be cnforoed under Art. 32. • - I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 129 . ORIGINAL JUlllso1cnoN: Petit
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