RAMGOPAL GANPATRAI RUIA & ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
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1957 Octobu8, 6l8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958] RAMGOPAL GANPATRAI RUIA & ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY (B. P. SINHA, GOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR, JJ;) Sessions Trial-Commitment proceeding-Order of discharge by Presidency Magistrate-High Court. if can set aside such order and direct com1J1itment-High Court's power of revision-'Sufficient grounds,' meaning of-Duty of Committing Magistrate-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) ss. 439, 209, 210, 213. The High Court has ample power under s. 439, read with s. 435, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to revise an order of discharge made by a Presidency Magistrate in a commitment proceeding, and to direct the committal of the accused person to the Court of Session. Section 439 of the Code contemplates all the powers of an Appellate court under s. 423 of the Code, except the power to convert a .finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that such powers may be exercised in the case of any proceed- ing. There is, therefore, no basis for the proposition that the High Court can revise only such orders as are made appoolable by the C9de. Malik Pratap Singh v. Khan Mohammed, (1909) I.LR. 36 Cal. 994 and Emperor v. Varjivandas alias Kalidas Bhaidas, (1902) I.L.R. 27 Born. 84, referred to. The words "sufficient grounds" occurring in ss. 209, 210 and 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not mean sufficient grounds for the purpose of conviction but mean such evidence as would be sufficient to put the accused up'm trial by the jury. In each case, therefore, the committing Magistrate has to be satisfied whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the accused person by reasonably reliable evidence. Where he is satisfied that it has been, he has to commit the accused to the Court of Session and it is for the jury to decide which of the conflicting versions it should accept and either to convict or acquit him. Queen Empress v. Namdev Satva]i, (1887) I.LR. II Born. 372 approved. Case-law reviewed. Consequently, in a case where a committing Presidency Magistrate, on a full and elaborate consideration of a large volume of evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced both by the prosecution and the defence came to the conclusion that no Criminal court would convict the accused persons on such evidence and discharged them and the High Court in exercise of its powers SUPREME COURT REPORTS 619 under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set aside the order of discharge and directed the committal of the accused persons to the Court of Session on charges .under s. 409 and s. 409 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code and it could not be said that the evidence had not made out a prima facie case against the accused persons or that it could not be reasonably relied on. Held, that it was pre-eminently a case for committal to the Court of Session, the order of discharge made by the Presidency Magistrate was highly improper and the High Court's order must be affirmed. Held further, that the appellants 9ould not be allowed to makeยท a grievance of the inordinate delay in bringing them to trial, for which they themselves were primarily responsible, and such delay could be no ground for not holding the trial at all. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRismcTION: Criminal Ap- peal No. 3 of 1954. Appeal by special leave froIJ1 the judgment and. order dated the 22nd June, 1951, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1425 of 1950, arising out of the judgment and order dated the 9th September, 1950, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate Fifth Court, Dadar, Bombay in Cause No. 7825/P of 1949. P. R. Das, S. A. Desai, SheUim Samuel and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant. B. D. Boovariwala, Jindra Lal and ~. H. Dhebo.r, for the respondent. 1957. October 8. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA, J . ..:._The main question for determination in this appeal by special leave is whether the High Court has power, and, if so, the extent of such power, to revise an order of discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate. The order impugned in this case was passed by a "Division Bench of the Bombay High Court (Bhagwati and Vyas, JJ.), dated June 22, 1951, setting aside the order dated September 9, 1950, passed by a Presidency Magistrate of Bombay, directing the appel- lants who were accused 1 and 2 before the lea:i:-ned magistrate to take their trial in the Court of Session
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