LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
โš–๏ธ Ask the AI about your situation:๐Ÿš— Car Accident๐Ÿ’ผ Work / Job๐Ÿ  Housing / Eviction๐Ÿ‘ช Family / Divorce๐Ÿ“‹ Contract Dispute๐Ÿ’ฐ Money Owed

RAMGOPAL GANPATRAI RUIA & ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY

Citation: [1958] 1 S.C.R. 618 · Decided: 08-10-1957 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

1957 
Octobu8, 
6l8 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1958] 
RAMGOPAL GANPATRAI RUIA & ANOTHER 
v. 
THE STATE OF BOMBAY 
(B. P. SINHA, GOVINDA MENON and 
J. L. KAPUR, JJ;) 
Sessions Trial-Commitment proceeding-Order of discharge 
by Presidency Magistrate-High Court. if can set aside such order 
and direct com1J1itment-High Court's power of revision-'Sufficient 
grounds,' meaning of-Duty of Committing Magistrate-Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) ss. 439, 209, 210, 213. 
The High Court has ample power under s. 439, read with 
s. 435, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to revise an order of 
discharge made by a Presidency Magistrate in a commitment 
proceeding, and to direct the committal of the accused person to 
the Court of Session. Section 439 of the Code contemplates all 
the powers of an Appellate court under s. 423 of the Code, except 
the power to convert a .finding of acquittal into one of conviction 
and that such powers may be exercised in the case of any proceed-
ing. There is, therefore, no basis for the proposition that the 
High Court can revise only such orders as are made appoolable 
by the C9de. 
Malik Pratap Singh v. Khan Mohammed, (1909) I.LR. 36 Cal. 
994 and Emperor v. Varjivandas alias Kalidas Bhaidas, (1902) 
I.L.R. 27 Born. 84, referred to. 
The words "sufficient grounds" occurring in ss. 209, 210 and 
213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not mean sufficient 
grounds for the purpose of conviction but mean such evidence as 
would be sufficient to put the accused up'm trial by the jury. In 
each case, therefore, the committing Magistrate has to be satisfied 
whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the 
accused person by reasonably reliable evidence. Where he is 
satisfied that it has been, he has to commit the accused to the 
Court of Session and it is for the jury to decide which of the 
conflicting versions it should accept and either to convict or 
acquit him. 
Queen Empress v. Namdev Satva]i, (1887) I.LR. II Born. 372 
approved. 
Case-law reviewed. 
Consequently, 
in a case where a committing 
Presidency 
Magistrate, on a full and elaborate consideration of a large volume 
of evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced both by the 
prosecution and the defence came to the conclusion 
that no 
Criminal court would convict the accused persons on such evidence 
and discharged them and the High Court in exercise of its powers 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
619 
under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure set aside the order 
of discharge and directed the committal of the accused persons to 
the Court of Session on charges .under s. 409 and s. 409 read with 
s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code and it could not be said that the 
evidence had not made out a prima facie case against the accused 
persons or that it could not be reasonably relied on. 
Held, that it was pre-eminently a case for committal to the 
Court of Session, the order of discharge made by the Presidency 
Magistrate was highly improper and the High Court's order must 
be affirmed. 
Held further, that the appellants 9ould not be allowed to 
makeยท a grievance of the inordinate delay in bringing them to 
trial, for which they themselves were primarily responsible, and 
such delay could be no ground for not holding the trial at all. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JuRismcTION: Criminal Ap-
peal No. 3 of 1954. 
Appeal by special leave froIJ1 the judgment and. 
order dated the 22nd June, 1951, of the Bombay High 
Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1425 of 
1950, arising out of the judgment and order dated the 
9th September, 1950, of the Court of the Presidency 
Magistrate Fifth Court, Dadar, Bombay in Cause No. 
7825/P of 1949. 
P. R. Das, S. A. Desai, SheUim Samuel and I. N. 
Shroff, for the appellant. 
B. D. Boovariwala, Jindra Lal and ~. H. Dhebo.r, 
for the respondent. 
1957. October 8. The following Judgment of the 
Court was delivered by 
SINHA, J . ..:._The main question for determination 
in this appeal by special leave is whether the High 
Court has power, and, if so, the extent of such power, 
to revise an order of discharge passed by a Presidency 
Magistrate. The order impugned in this case was 
passed by a "Division Bench of the Bombay High Court 
(Bhagwati and Vyas, JJ.), dated June 22, 1951, setting 
aside the order dated September 9, 1950, passed by a 
Presidency Magistrate of Bombay, directing the appel-
lants who were accused 1 and 2 before the lea:i:-ned 
magistrate to take their trial in the Court of Session

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.