RAMESHWAR versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN.

Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 377 · Decided: 20-12-1951 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SIR SYED FAZL ALI · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
377 
RAMESHWAR 
v. 
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN. 
[SAIYID FAZL Au and VrVIAN BosE JJ.] 
Indian Penal Code (XLV of 18@0), s. 376-Indian Evidence Act 
(I of 1872), s. 114(b) 118, 133, 157-Indian Oaths Act (X of 1873), 
ss. 5, 6, 13-Rape on 
young girl-Necessity of corroboration of 
girl's testimony-Statement 
made to mother-Whether 
sufficient 
corroboration-Rule 
as to 
corroboration-Nature 
and extent of 
corroboration necessary-Admissibility of 
statement made "at or 
about!' the time of occurrence-Admissibility of evidence of child 
under 12 years. 
An omission to administer an oath, even to an adult, goes 
only to the credibility of the witness and not 
his competency; 
so a1so an omission of the Court or the authority examining a 
child witness formally to record that in 
its opinion the witness 
understands the duty of speaking the truth 
though he does not 
understand the nature of an oath or affirmation, does 
not affect 
the admissibility of the evidence given by that witness. 
Though it is desirable 
that judges • and magistrates should 
always record their opinion when a child is to be examined that 
the child understands the duty of speaking the truth, and state 
why they think so, whether a magistrate or judge was really of 
that opinion can be gathered from the circumstances when there 
;_,. 
is no formal certificate to that effect on the record. 
Mohamed s;gal Esa v. The King (A.LR. 1946 P.C. 3), R. v. Setva 
Bhogta (14 Beng. L.R. 294 F.N.), Samujh v. Emperor (1907) (10 
0. C. 337) referred to. 
Though a woman who has been raped is not an accomplice, 
her evidence has been treated by the Courts on somewhat similar 
lines, :ind the rule which requires corroboration of such evidence 
save in exceptional circumstances has now hardened into law. 
The rule laid down in King v. Baskerville (L. R. 1916, 
2 
K.B. 658) with regard to the admissibility of the uncorroborated 
evidence of an accomplice is the law in 
India also 
so far as 
accomplices are concerned and it is not any higher in the case of 
sexual offences. 
The only clarification of the rule that is neces-
sary for the purposes of India is where this class of offence is 
tried by a judge without the aid of a jury. In such cases it is 
necessary that the judge should give some indication in his judg-
ment that he has had the rule of caution in his mind and should 
proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require 
corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and 
show why he considers it safe to convict without corroboration 
in that particular 
case. 
There is, 
however, 
no rule of law or 
1951 
Dec. 2(}. 
1951 
iR.atJJcshwar 
v. 
The State of 
Rajasthan. 
378 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1952] 
practice that there must in every case be corroboration before a 
conviction can be allowed to stand. 
The vie\v 
that though 
corroboration 
should ord_inarily_ • be 
required in the case of a grown-up woman, it is unnCcessary in 
the 
case 
of 
a child of 
tender years is not correct. The true 
position is that in every case of this _type the rule about the 
advisability of corroboration 
shoul<l be present to the mind of 
the judge;. whether corroboration is unnecessary 
is a question 
Of ~act in every case. 
, 
Bishram v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 363) not approved; 
Mohamed Sugai Esa v. The King (A.LR. 1946 P.C. 3) followeu': 
The nature and the extent of the corroboration that is iequired 
when it is 
not considered safe to 
dispense 
with it, inust neces-
sarily vary 
\Vith the 
circumstances 
of each 
case 
and 
also 
according to 
the particular circumstances of 
the offence charged. 
It is however clear 
(i) that it is not .necessary that there should 
be independent confirmation of every material 
circumstan~ in 
the sense that the independent evidence in the case, apart from 
the testimony 
of the complainant or accomplice, 
should itself be 
sufficient to sustain 
conviction; all that is 
required 
is that there 
must be "some additional evide.nce rendering it probable that the 
story of the accomplice (or the complainant) is true and that it is 
reasonably safe t9 act upon it."; (ii) The indepen.dent evidence"must 
riqt ·only make it safe 
to. believe 
that the ·crime was committed 
but must in some 
way reasonably 
connect the 
accused 
with it; 
(iii_) the corroboration .must come from independent sources and 
thus ofdinarily the 
testimony of 
one 
accomplice would • not be 
sufficient 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.