RAMESHWAR SHAW versus DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BURDWAN & ANR.

Citation: [1964] 4 S.C.R. 921 · Decided: 11-09-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 17 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

-
4 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
RAMESHWAR SHAW 
ti. 
921 
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, BURDWAN & ANR. 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo, K. N. WANCHoo, 
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MunHOLKAR JJ.) 
Preventive Detention-Person in jail custody-Detention order, 
£f can be served-Validity-"Satisfaction" of the 
authority-Pre~ 
venJive Detention Act, 1950 (Act 4 of 1950), s. 3(1). 
The petitioner \Vas detained by the order of the District Ma-
gistrate under the provisions of the Prev~ntive Detention 
Act, 
1950. 
'fhe order recited that the District Magistrate was satis-
fied that it \Vas necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to 
prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the mainten-
ance of Public order. This order was served on the petitioner on 
the 15th February 1963, while he was in jail custody as an un-
der-trial prisoner 1n connection with a criminal case pending 
against him. 
It was urged on behalf of the pet1ttoner that the detention of 
the petitioner was not justified by the provisions of s. 3(1) of the 
Act and was as such invalid. 
HELD (i) The reasonbleness of the satisfaction of the de-
taining authority cannot be questioned in a court of law for the 
reason that the satisfaction of the detaining authority to 
which 
s. 3(1 )(a) refers is his subjective satisfaction; the adequacy of 
the material 
on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also 
cannot be examined in a court of law. That is 
the true 
legal position in regard to the satisfaction contemplated by 
s. 
3(1)(a) of the Act. 
The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya, (1951] 
S.C.R. 167, relied on. 
(ii) The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can 
be taken into account in making a detention order, but the past 
conduct or antecedent history of the person, on which the au· 
thority purports to act, should ordinarily be proximate in point of 
time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion 
that the detention of the person is necessary. 
Ujagar Singh v. The State of Punjab and fagajit Singh 
v. 
The State of Punjab, [1952] S.C.R. 756, relied on. 
(iii) As an abstract proposition of law, there n1ay not be any 
doubt tha~ s. 3(l)(a) of the Aa does ?ot preclude the authority 
~rom pass~ng an ~rd~r. of detention against a person whilst he i.5 
1n detention or in 1a1l. 
But the 
relevant facts in connection 
w_ith the i;iaking of _the_ order may ~li~er and that may make a 
difference m the apphcation of the pnnc1ple that a detention order 
59-2 S C lndia/64 
1963 
September, 11 
1963 
Ramesh war 
Shaw 
v. 
District 
Magistrate, 
Burdwan & 
Anr. 
Gajendra-
gadkar ]. 
922 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1964] 
can be passed against a person in jail. 
In dealing with this 
question, the considerations of proximity of time will be a rele-
vant factor. The question as to whether an order of detention can 
be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, 
will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each 
case. 
Basanta Chandra GhoS< v. Emporer, A.LR. 1945 F.C. 18, ex-
plained. 
(iv) An order of detention cannot be validly served on a per-
son ,vho is already in jail custQ.,dy and in respect of whom it is 
rationally not possible to predicate that if the said order is not 
served on hi1n, he would be able to indulge in any prejudicial 
activity. 
Section 3( 1) of the Act necessarily postulates that a 
person sought to be detained would be free to act in a .preju-
dicial manner if he is not detained. 
In other words, the free--
dom of action to the person sought to be detained at the rele-
vant time n1ust be sho¥.'n before an order of detention can be 
validly served on him under the said section. 
If a person 
is 
already in jail custody it cannot be rationally postulated that 
if he is not detained he '\Vould act in a prejudicial manner. 
Labaram Deka Barua v. State, 
A.LR. 
1951 
Assam 43, 
and 
Haridas Deka v. State, A.LR. 1952 Assam 175, relied on. 
Sahadat Ali v. State of Assam, A.LR. 1953 Assam 97, refer-
red to. 
( v) The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person 
for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial 
manner is thus the basis of the order under s. 3(1)(a), and this 
basis is clearly absent in the case of the petitioner. 
The de-
tention of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case, 
is not justified by s. 3(l)(a). In the present case the petitioner 
\Vas ordered to be released on the ground that he was served 
with the order of detenti

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