RAMAN (DEAD) BY LRS. versus R. NATARAJAN

Citation: [2022] 11 S.C.R. 227 · Decided: 13-09-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: INDIRA BANERJEE, V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

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RAMAN (DEAD) BY LRS.
v.
R. NATARAJAN
(Civil Appeal No. 6554 of 2022)
SEPTEMBER 13, 2022
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.12, 13(1)(b) – Limitation Act,
1963 – s.18(1), Art.54 – Suit for specific performance involving
third party – Grant of decree for specific performance – Correctness
of – Held: High Court ought to have seen that the specific
performance of the Agreement in question comprised of two parts
(i) the defendant (predecessor of appellants) entering into an
agreement with his brother’s wife for the purchase of a land for
providing access to the land agreed to be sold under the suit
Agreement of Sale; and (ii) the defendant then executing a sale
deed conveying the property covered by the suit Agreement of Sale
– Since the defendant’s brother’s wife was not a party to the suit
agreement of sale, the Court cannot compel her to enter into an
agreement with the defendant – Thus, performance of the first part
of the obligation cannot be compelled by the Court, as it depended
upon the will of a third party – Consequently, the performance of
the second part of the obligation, may be hit by s.12(1) – Also,
none of the exceptions contained in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4)
will apply – Even the limited rights conferred by s.13(1)(b) are not
available to the respondent-plaintiff – Further, the High Court could
not have answered the question of limitation in favour of the
respondent without framing any substantial question of law and
without even a reference to Article 54 – Impugned judgment set
aside – Relief of specific performance claimed by the respondent is
rejected.
Suit – For specific performance involving third party – Held:
Court cannot grant the relief of specific performance against a
person compelling him to enter into an agreement with a third party
and seek specific relief against such a third party.
[2022] 11 S.C.R. 227
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 11 S.C.R.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The mistakes committed by the High Court
were manifold. First, the High Court framed a question which
was actually a question of fact which involved appreciation of
evidence and not a substantial question of law. As a consequence,
the answer given by the High Court was only a finding of fact.
Next, the High Court reversed the finding of the First Appellate
Court on the question of limitation, without framing a substantial
question of law and without even referring to the statutory
provisions. The Agreement is dated 19.06.1993. The Agreement
contains four endorsements which are dated 12.11.1995,
11.05.1998, 27.01.2001, 10.07.2005. The defendant raised the
question of limitation, on the basis of the fact that the fourth
endorsement was made beyond a period of three years from the
date of the third endorsement. Such a defence was based upon
Section 18(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963. But as a matter of fact,
the limitation for filing a suit for specific performance, in terms of
Article 54 of The Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 is three
years, “from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date
is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is
refused.” But in the entire memorandum of grounds of second
appeal filed by the respondent before the High Court, there was
no whisper or reference to Article 54 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963. The only substantial question of law framed
by the High Court at the time of entertaining the second appeal
was not about limitation revolving around Article 54 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, the High Court could
not have answered the question of limitation in favour of the
respondent herein, (i) without framing any substantial question
of law; and (ii) without even a reference to Article 54. [Paras 11-
15][232-G-H; 233-A-E]
1.2 In any case, the High Court ought to have seen that a
Court cannot grant the relief of specific performance against a
person compelling him to enter into an agreement with a third
party and seek specific relief against such a third party. In other
words, the specific performance of the agreement by the appellants
herein, depended upon (i) the appellants entering into an
agreement with a third party; and (ii) appellants being in a position
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to compel such third party to perform her obligations under such
agreement. The High Court ought to have seen that the specific
performance of the Agreement in que

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