LexRAMACHANDRA SHENOY AND ANOTHER. versus MRS. HILDA BRITE AND OTHERS
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1163 Apil I. • 722 SUPRE!tfE COURT REPORTS [1964] vot. RAMACHANDRA SHENOY AND ANOTHER. v. MRS. HILDA BRITE AND OTHERS (S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR and N. RAJAGOP.A.LA AYYAXGAR JJ.) Will-Constructfon-"Shall enjoy permanently and with absolute right'', "After her life-lime," .Meaning o/-Principlts of construction. :\Irs. Mary Magdclcne Coelho executed onjuly 25, 1907, a will, cl. 3 (c) of which provided that "all kinds of movable properties that shall be in my possession and authority at the time of my death, i. e., all kinds of movable properties inclu· sive of the amounts that shall be got from others and the cash ; all these my eldest daughter Severina Sobina Coelho, shall, after my death, enjoy anll after her life-time, her male children shall enjoy permanently and with absolute right." Mrs. C'.oelho died in February, 1946, and in September, 1946, a suit was filed for partition and separate possession by the widow and daughter of Denis-one of the sons of Severina. The contention of plaintiff• was that Severina acquired under the terms of cl. 3 (c) only a life-interest in the property and the remainder in absolute \1,•a~conferrcd upon her male issues. The defendants maintained that cl. 3 (c) conferred on Severina an absolute interest in the property as a result of which the entire interest in the property and not merely her life interest passed under the Court auction and consequently the claim for partition must fail. The contention of the defendants was accepted by the trial court and the District Judge. However, the High Court held that Severina obtained only a life interest in the property covered by cl, 3 (c). The appellants came to this Court by special leave. The ·only point urged before tJi!s Court. was that under cl. 3 (c), Severina got an absolute interest m the property and not merely a life interest. Held that the only reasonable construction of cl. 3 (c) was that the interest created in favour of Severina was merely a life interest and the remainder in absolute was conferrecl il s.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 723 on her mak children. The use of the words "after her lifetime" was intended to show that the interest referred to was a life interest. One of the cardinal principles of construction of wills is that, to the extent that it is legally possible, effect should be given to every disposition con•~ined in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Moreover, each will has to be construed on its own terms and in the setting in which the clauses occur. CIVIL APPELLA'.l'E JURISDICTION : Ci vii Appeal No. 452 of 1959. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 25, 1959, of the Madras High Court in S. C. No. 2371' of 1950. S. N. Andley and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, G. Gopalakrishnan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents Nos. 1and19. • M. V. Goswami and 13. G. Misr:.1, for respon- dents Nos. 8-14. 1963. April 1. TheJudgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J.-This appeal by special leave raises for consideration a very short but by 110 means an easy question regarding the proper construction of a will. The testatrix ·was an Indian Christian lady of the Roman Catholic faith-Mrs. Mary Magdelene Coelho. She was a widow and was possessed ot considerable properties in respect of which ·she had previously executed settlements in favour of her children. The will whose construction falls for determination was executed on July 25, 1907 and related to the properties still remaining with· her after these settlements. She had originally four 1963 Ramac/f4ttdr4 S,11n~y v. Hilt/a Britt AyyQlfgar J. 1913 · flmne<Awr• s,,..,, •• Hili• Britt 724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. daughters, but by the date of the will only two of them were alive-her eldest Severina Sabina Brito and her second Mary Matilda Coelho. The other members of her family then alive and to whom it is necessary to refer were a grand·daughterJuli Mary Margaret Fernandez by her deceased 4th daughter and four sons of the eldest <laughter Severina. It may be added that the third daughter who died before 190i left no issue. We might now proceed to the terms of the will. The relevant clause whose interpretation is the subject of debate in this appeal is its cl. 3 (c). Clauses l and . 2 arc in the nature of an introduc.tion, contain no disposition but are merely a narratio
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