RAMA NARANG versus RAMESH NARANG AND ANR.

Citation: [2006] 3 S.C.R. 1068 · Decided: 12-04-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: RUMA PAL · Disposal: Hearing Adjourned

Cited by 6 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
RAMANARANG 
11. 
RAMESH NARANG AND ANR. 
APRIL 12, 2006 
B 
[MRS. RUMA PAL, B.N. SRIKRISHNA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971-Section 2 (b)-(;onsent Order and 
decree passed by Supreme Court on the basis of an agreement of settlement 
C entered into by the parties-Violation of certain clauses of the agreement by 
one of the parties-Initiation of contempt proceedings before the Court by 
opposite party- -Preliminary objection raised as to its maintainability on the 
ground that the consent order did not contain an undertaking or an irijunction 
of the Court-(;urrectness of-Held, a consent decree is a contract with the 
imprimatur of the Cuurt----Consent decree, though executable, will not take 
D away the jurisdiction of the Courts under the Contempt of Courts Act-
Hence, the preliminary objection is dismissed and the contempt petition to 
be decided on merits. 
Petitioner is the father of two of the respondents who are the children 
of his first wife whom he had divorced. The petitioner has children from his 
E second wife. Several suits and counter suits were filed by the parties. In a 
contempt proceeding initiated by Respondent no. I against the petitioner 
before this Court, the parties filed a 'Minutes of Consent Order' stating a 
settlement of all the disputes between the parties. The parties wanted this 
Court to dispose of all the suits and proceedings between the parties in terms 
F of the Minutes. Accordingly, this Court withdrew all the suits pending before 
different Courts under Article 139-A of the Constitution of India and disposed 
of the suits and the contempt proceedings thereby in terms of the minutes. 
The petitioner filed a Contempt petition before this Court against the 
respondents contending that the respondents had violated certain clauses of 
G the Minutes of the consent order which were admitted by them; and hence 
they had committed contempt of Court for wilful disobedience of the orders of 
this Court. 
The respondents raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability 
of the contempt petition contending that the consent order did not contain an 
H 
1~8 
RAMA NARANG v. RAMESH NARANG 
1069 
undertaking or an injunction of the Court; and that the mere imprimatur of A 
the Court to a consent arrangement was not sufficient to attract contempt 
jurisdiction. 
The petitioner contended that there is no distinction between the orders 
of the Court passed on merits .and orders passed on consent; and that a decree 
for injunction whether directory or prohibitary can only be enforced by way B 
of contempt proceedings. 
Dismissing the preliminary objection of the respondents the Court 
HELD: 1.1. The definition of 'civil contempt' under section 2 (b) of the 
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for two categories of cases, namely, C 
(1) the wilful disobedience to a process of Court and (2) wilful breach of an 
undertaking given to Court. As far as the first category is concerned, the 
word "any" further indicates the wide nature of power. No distinction is 
statutorily drawn between an order passed for an adjudication and an order 
passed by consent. This first category is separate from the second and cannot D 
be treated as forming part of or taking colour from the second category. The 
legislative intention clearly was to distinguish between the two and create 
distinct classes of contumacious behaviour. [1078-E, F, G) 
1.2. A compromise decree is as much a decree as a decree passed on 
adjudication. It is not an agreement between the parties. In passing the decree E 
by consent, the Court adds its mandate to the consent. A consent decree is 
composed of both a command and a contract. A consent decree is a contract 
with the imprimatur of the Court. In other words, by passing a decree in terms 
of a consent order, the Court authorises and approves the course of action 
consented to. [1081-A-C] 
F 
1.3. Consent orders, though executable under the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908, would not take away the jurisdiction of the Courts to deal 
with a matter under the Contempt of Courts Act provided the Court is satisfied 
that the violation of the order or decree is such, that if proved, it would warrant 
punishment under section 13 of the Act on the ground that the contempt G 
substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course 
of justice. [1081-C, D, E) 
Rosnan Sam Boyce v. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1990] 2 SCC 636 
and Salkia Busine

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.