RAMA DAYAL MARKARHA versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [1978] 3 S.C.R. 497 · Decided: 14-03-1978 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI · Disposal: Case Partly allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

I 
; 
' 
RAMA DAY AL MARKARHA 
v. 
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
March 14, 1978 
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] 
497 
Contempt of Courts Act 1977, Sections 5, 13-Fair com1nents-Publication 
of pa1nphlet by an Advocate in1puting niotives to a Magistrare-Tests to judge 
if conzment is fair. 
The appellant a Senior 
Practising Advocate 
in Un1aria 
District Sahdol, 
~fadhva Pradesh was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine Rs. 1,000/- under 
s. 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, by the High Court. The appellant 
appeared on behalf of some accused persons in a criminal trial before the 
Additional District hi!agistrate. 
The accused were convicted by the Magistrate. 
They filed an appeal which was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 
Before the date for challe1.1ging the said judgment of Addl. Sessions Judge by 
\Vay of revision in the High Court expired, the appellant published a pamphlet. 
Jn ,the pan1phlct imputations of improper motive to the learned I\1agistrate in 
deciding the case \Vere made. 
The appellant did not question the authorship 
and publication of the pamphlet. 
However, his defence was that V.'hat he did 
was merely publishing a fair comment on the merits of a crin1inal case which 
was heard and finally decided and that therefore he was entitled to the benefit 
of s. 5 of the Act. Alternatively it was contended that even if the Court came 
to the conclusion that he was guilty of contempt of court no sentence should 
be imposed upon him because the publication is not likely 
to substantially 
interfere or V.'QlJ.l_d tend substantially to interfere with the due course of justice 
and therefore, he is entitled to benefit of s. 13. 
Partially allowing the appeal 
HELD : 1. The statement in the pamphlet "should the judge with his way-
ward bend of mind go on using \vayward 11en" is nothing short of imputing a 
deliberate motivated approach on the part of the Judge. 
Similarly to say that 
the judgment proceeded in one direction but thereafter it took a somersault 
because the Magistrate had resolved to convict the accused in spite .of there 
being no evidence would clearly insinuate that the issues were prejudged by 
the Judge. [502 C-D] 
2. Even prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 a fair 
and reasonable criticism of judicial act did not constitute contempt and this che-
rished and noble facet of the larger liberty of freedom of speech and expression 
enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has found its echo in s. 5 of 
the Act. 
The 1imit of fair comment being an integral part of the larger liberty 
of freedom of ~.veech and expression it could not be -put in a straight-jacket 
formula or converted into a master key which will open any lock. 
More or 
less it would depend upon the facts and ci_rcumstances of each case, the situation 
and circumstances in which the act was done, the language employed the context 
in which the criticism was offered and the -people for whose benefit the exercise 
was undertaken and the effect which it will -produce on the litigants and society 
in relation to courts and administration of justice. [502 Ci-I-I, 503 A.-B] 
3. Contempt jurisdiction is a special and to some extent an unusual type of 
jurisdiction wherein the prosecutor and the Judge are combined in 
one. To 
some extent it trenches upon the fundamental right of free speech and expression 
and stifles criticism of a public officer concerned with the administration of 
public justice in discharge of his public duty. Therefore, the contempt jurisdic-
tion has to be sparinglv 
exercised '1.rith utmost 
restraint and 
considerable 
circuinspcction. 
[503 H, -504 A, CJ 
Baradakanta v. Registrar, Orissa High Court, 
AIR 1974 SC 710 at 735; 
Queen v. Gray. (1900) 2 Q.B. 36 at 40; Regina v. Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis, ex-parte Blackburn, (1968) 2 Weekly Law Reports 1204 at 
1207; referred to. 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
498 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1978] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
Pl-rspectire Publicdtions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Mahara.~htra, [1969] 
B 
c 
2 SCR 779 at 791-792 applied. 
4. Fair and reasonable criticism of a judgment which is a public document 
or which is a public act of a Judge concerned with administration of justice 
would not constitute contempt. 
In fact such fair 
and 
reasonable 
criticism 
must be encouraged because after all no one, much less Judges, can claim 
infallibility. Such a criticism may fairly assert that the judgment is incorrect 
or 

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