RAM SARUP versus UNION OF LNDIA AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1964] 5 S.C.R. 931 · Decided: 12-12-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

--
-
--
5 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
931 
been in custody for about 10 months before that. 
1963 
On a consideration of all the circumstances of the 
-.-
case we reduce the sentenc1! on these women-appellants Mathurz andora. 
under s. 304 Part JI read with s. 149, s 326149 and 
v. 
s. 148 to the period of imprisonment already under- Statt of Punjab 
gone. 
Das Gupta I. 
Of the four male appellants Surjan was aged 
70 at the time of the trial and Gokul 66. 
Surjan 
is thus about 73 years old now and Gokul just less 
than 70. In consideration of their age we think 
that the interests of justice will be served if their 
sentences are also reduced to the period of imprison-
ment already undergone. We reduce their sentences 
accordingly. Let these accused persons be set at 
liberty, if not required in connection with some other 
proceedings. We see no reason to interfere with 
the sentences passed on the other two male appel-
lants. 
The appeal by the accused persons is thus dis-
missed except as regards the modification in sentences 
of eight of them. 
The appeal preferred by the State 
of Punjab is dismissed. 
Appeals dismissed. 
RAM SARUP 
v. 
THE UNION OF lNDIA AND ANOTHER 
(B.P. SINHA, C.J., K.N. \VANCHOO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, 
N. _RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J.R. MUDHOLKAll, 
JJ.) 
Army Act (XLVI of 1950), ss. 125, 126 and 164-Scope of-
-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 33-Effect on fundamental 
rights-s. 125 of Army Act if violative of Art. 14 of the Constitu-
tion. 
The General Court Martial sentenced the petitioner, a sepoy, 
to death under s. 69 of the Army Act read with s. 302 of the Indian 
1965 
Duember Jl 
1963 
Ram Sarup 
v. 
932 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1964] 
Penal Code for shooting dead two sepoys and a Havildar. The 
Central Government confirmed the sentence. The petitione:r 
filed writs of habeas corpus and certiorari for setting aside the: 
orders of the Court Martial and the Central Government ancl 
for his release. 
The Union of 
India and another 
Held: (i) The p~titioner made no req_uest for being represen·· 
ted at the court martial by a counsel of his choice; consequently 
no such request was refused, and that there has been no violation 
of the fundamental right of the petitioner to be defended by a. 
counsel of his choice. 
. (ii) There has been no non-compliance of the provisions 
of s. 132(2) of the Act. In view of the provisions of rr. 45, 46, 
61(2) and 62 of the Army Rules, 1954, the petitioner's statement, 
that the death sentence was voted by an inadequate majority of 
the members of the Court which can be considered to be a mere 
allegation, cannot be based on any definite knowledge as to how 
the voting went at the consideration of the finding in pursuance 
of r. 61. 
(iii) Section 164 does not lay down that the correctness of the 
order or sentence of the Court Martial is always to be decided 
by two higher authorities; it only provides for two remedies. The 
further petition can only be made to the authority superior to the 
authority which confirms the order of the Court Martial, and if 
there be no authority superior to the confirming authority, the 
question of remedy against its order does not arise. 
(i,v) Each and every provision of the Army Act is a law made 
by Parliament and ·that if any such provision tends to affect the 
fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution; that pro-
vision does not, on that account, become void, as it must be taken 
that Parliament has in exercise of its power under Art. 33 of the 
Constitution made the requisite modification to affect the respec-
tive fundamental right. 
(v) The provisions of s. 125 of the Act are not discriminatory 
and do not infringe the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitu-
tion. 
(vi) The discretion to be exercised by the Military Officer 
specified in ·s. 125 of the Act as to the trial of accused by Court 
Martial or by an ordinary court, cannot be said to be unguided 
by any other policy laid down in the Act or uncontrolled by any 
authority. There could be a variety of circumstances which may 
influence the decision· as to whether the offender be tried by a 
Court Martial or by ordinary criminal court and therefore 
becomes inevitable that the discretion to make the choice as to 
which court should try the accused be left to responsible Military 
Officers ·under whom the accused is serving. 
Those officers are 
to be guided by considerations of the exigencies of the service 
maintenance of discipline in the army, 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.