RAM SARAN LALL AND OTHERS versus MST. DOMINI KUER AND OTHERS.

Citation: [1962] 2 S.C.R. 474 · Decided: 27-04-1961 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

1961 
April 27, 
474 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1962] 
RAM SARAN LALL AND OTHERS 
v. 
MST. DOMINI KUER AND OTHERS. 
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA, 
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and 
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
Registration-Sale-When complcle-I f complete only on date 
of registration-Pre-emption-Indian Registration Act, .r908 (XVI 
of I908}, ss. 47 and 6I. 
P executed a sale deed on January 31, 1946, in respect of a 
house in favour of D and presented it for registration on the 
same day. On coming to know of the execution of the sale 
deed, the appellant who had a right of pre-emption, made the 
talab-i-mowasibat on February 2, 1946. The deed was copied out 
in the Registrar's books on February 9, 1946, and thereupon the 
registration became complete as provided in s. 6r of the Regis-
tration Act. The appellant filed a suit for pre-emption. D 
resisted the suit on the ground that the sale was completed on 
February 9, 1946, and the talab had been made prematurely. 
The appellant contended that in view of s. 47 f<egistration Act 
a registered document operated from the time it "Wuuld have 
otherwise operated and the sale was completed on the date of 
its execution. 
Held (per Sinha, C. J., Sarkar and Mudholkar, Jj.) that the 
sale was completed only on February 9, r946, when the registra-
tion was complete, that the talab was made prematurely and 
that the suit must fail. 
Section 47 merely permitted a docu-
ment when registered to operate from a date which may be 
earlier than the date on which it was registered, it did not say 
when the sale would be deemed to be complete. A sale which 
was required to be registered was not completed until the regis-
tration of the deed was completed. 
· 
Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain, A.LR. (1921) Pat. 150, 
Nareshchandra Datta v. Gireeshchandra Das, (1935) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 
979, and Gobardhan Bar v. Guna Dhar Bar, LL.R. (1940) II Cal. 
270, approved. 
Bindeshri v. Somnath Bhadry, A.LR. (1916) All. 199 and 
Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Himir, A.LR. (1926) All. 549, distin-
guished. 
Per Das Gupta and Ayyangar, JJ.-The sale was completed 
on the day of execution and the talab was made at the right 
time. Section 61 had nothing to do with the time when the 
sale evidenced by the registered deed became complete; it refers 
merely to the fact that .the registering officer had completed his 
duty. Section 47 provided when a sale was deemed to be com-
pleted. There was no difference between the time when a sale 
2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
475 
became effective and the time it could be held to be completed. 
r96r 
Under s. 47 the crucial test for determining the time from 
which the registered document was to have effect or be deemed Ram Saran Lall 
to be completed was the intention of the parties. The sale 
v. 
deed shows that the parties intended that the deed should beMst. Domini f(uer 
effective from the date of execution. 
CIVIL 
APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION: 
Civil Appeal 
No. 104 of 1959. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and 
decree dated December 19, 1956, of the Patna High 
Court in Appeal from the Appellate Decree No. 632 
of 1949. 
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India and R. O. 
Prasad, for the appellants. 
S. P. Varma, for respondent No. 1. 
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for Intervener. 
1961. 
April 27. 
The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., 
Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by Sar-
kar, J. The judgment of Das Gupta and Ayyan-
gar, JJ., was delivered by Ayyangar, J. 
SARKAR, J.-The parties to this litigation are all 
Sarkar J. 
Hindus but it is not in dispute that the Mohammedan 
law of pre-emption is applicable to them by custom, 
nor that the appellants had a right of pre-emption. 
The only question is whether the first demand called 
talab-i-mowasibat which has to be made after the 
completion of the sale in order that the right may be 
enforced, was made before or after such completion. 
The making of the demand is not in dispute but the 
dispute is as to when the sale was completed. 
The appellants had their residential house conti-
guous to the house owned by certain persons whom 
we may call Pandeys. On January 31, 1946, the 
Pandeys executed a deed of sale in favour of the res-
pondent purchaser in respect of their aforesaid house. 
The appellants claim a right of pre-emption on 
account of this sale. The consideration mentioned in 
the deed was Rs. 2,000. There was a subsisting mort-
gage on that house and the deed provided that out of 
the consideration

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.