RAM NATH AND OTHERS versus DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION AND OTHERS

Citation: [1988] 1 S.C.R. 875 · Decided: 10-11-1987 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SABYASACHI MUKHERJI, G.L. OZA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

r 
1 
RAM NATH AND OTHERS 
v. 
DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION AND OTHERS 
NOVEMBER IO, 1987 
[SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.) 
Suit for eviction from land under section 209 of the Zamindari 
Abolition and Land Reforms Act-Title to land by adverse possession. 
A 
B 
The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order 
\ 
of the Deputy Director of consolidation. The appellants filed appeal in 
this Court against the order of the High Court. The appeal came up for C 
hearing on May 7, 1987, when it was dismissed for default of appeara-
nce, whereafter an application for restoration was filed on the ground 
that counsel for the appellants was busy in the High Court at the time of 
hearing of the appeal. This Court found no justification for recalling its 
order, dismissing the appeal, hut in view of the fact that the appellants D 
would suffer for no fault of theirs, decided to hear the matter, directing 
that this practice should not he permitted in this Court any further. 
y 
Dismissing the appeal (on merits), the Court, 
HELD: There is no merit in the appeal. The High Court was right E 
in holding that the respondents (concerned) were in possession of the 
land in 1958 when the case started under section 145 of the Cr. P. C. and 
their date of occupation could not be later than 8.5.1958, so that the six 
years' period of limitation for a suit for their eviction under section 209 
of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would start running 
from July 1, 1958 and expire on June 30, 1964 i.e. before the consolida-
F 
tion operations commenced. The appellants contended that there was a 
break in the possession of the respondents concerned between 8.5.1958 
and 29.1.60, but during that period the land was in the custody·ofthe 
Criminal Court which must be deemed to have been holding possession 
of the land on behalf of the person eventually found to be entitled to 
possession. The respondents had matured their title by adverse posses-
G 
sion and there could he no warrant for denying them the status of 
rightful owners. There was no break in the possession of the respon-
dents and they must he held to have been in continuous occupation at 
least from May, 1958. [877 A-Fl 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Miscellaneous H 
875 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
876 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1988] 1 S.C.R. 
Petition No. 1483 of 19.87. (In Civil Appeal No. 573 of 1974). 
From the Judgment and Order dated 9 .4.1973 of the Allahabad 
High Court in Special Appeal No. 537 of 1970. 
P.K. Bajaj and S.K. Bagga for the Appellants. 
G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondents. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered: 
ORDER 
The appeal was listed on 7.5.1987 before a bench consisting of 
Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.L. Oza and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Singh. 
The order recited "Heard learned counsel for the respondent for suffi-
cient time. No one appears for the appellants. The appeal is, there-
fore, dismissed in default." 
This C.M.P. was subsequently filed for recalling the order on the 
ground that the learned counsel was busy in the Delhi High Court on 
that date. It was further stated there "But when after arguing two 
cases viz. Company Petition No. 110 of 1983 Ishwar Singh and Others 
v. Dharam Singh and others, (final hearing) and also other regular 
matter Suit No, 49 of 1976 A.C. Tamra v. Mercury Production (part 
heard) in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi he (meaning thereby 
the counsel for the appellant) came to this Hon'ble Court, he came to 
know that this appeal had reached for hearing and was dismissed for 
default". This petition is signed not by the appellant but by M/s. Bagga 
& Co., Advocates for the appellant. It is verified by an affidavit of one 
P.K. Bajaj who state that he had been instructed to appear and argue 
the appeal. W.e are not sure as to who is making this application and 
whether the appellant is at all aware of these events. We find no 
justification for recalling the order on the plea that the counsel was 
busy somewhere. We were not inclined to act upon this kind of plea 
but on the basis that otherwise the appellant would suffer loss for no 
fault of his, we have decided to hear the counsel. This practice should 
not be permitted in this Court any further. 
On perusal of the judgment of the High Court we find no merit in 
this appeal. By the impugned judgment of the High Court of 
Allahabad, writ petition was allowed and the order of the Deputy 
Director of Consolidation dated th

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.