RAM KRISSEN SINGH versus DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, BANKURA DIVISION & OTHERS

Citation: [1965] 1 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 04-08-1964 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
RAM KRI&SEN SINGH 
v. 
DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER 
BANKURA DIVISION & OTHERS 
B 
August 4, 1964 
c 
D 
E 
r 
G 
H 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J., K. N. WANCHOO, 
M. HmAYATULLAH, J. c. SHAH AND N. RAJAGOPALA 
AYYANGAR Jl.) 
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 ·(West Bengal Act 1 of 
1954) as amended by West Bengal Act (25 of 1957)-Section 5(aa)-
Eltates-Acquisition of-Es.tates 'and rights of intermediaries in 
~states 
vatlng in State from date specified in notification by State Government-
RW/tt to cut zamindar.i trees granted by intermediary to third person whether 
would also vest in State by virtue of amended law--Construction and va/i-
ciity of am_endment. 
The appellant had been granted by the Zamindar of Simlapal in West 
Bengal a right to cut trees in certain forests of the zamindari. 
The exercise 
of this ri1!11t was interrupted by action taken against him under the West 
Bengal Private Forests Act, 1948. The appellant filed a writ petition under 
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the meantime, the West 
:lengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, (Act 1 of 1954) was passed. 
This 
Act provided that from the date specified in a notification under section 4 
of the Act, property and interests specified in section S of the Act would 
vest in the State Government. According to the Forest Department Iba 
right to cut trees enjoyed by the appellant was within the purview of 
section 5 of the Act and, therefore, had become vested in the State Govern-
ment. 
Certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court, however, went against 
this interpretation; it was held therein that a right to cut trees granted by an 
intermediary to a third person was not within the terms of section 5. There-
upon the State Legislature of West Bengal passed Act 25 of 1957 which 
by adding section S(aa) to the Act provided that upon the due publication 
of a notification under section 4, on !llld from the <fate of vesting, all lands 
in any estate comprised in a forest together with all rights to trees therein 
or the produce thereof and held by an intermediary or any other person 
shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, 
decree or order of any Court or Tribunal, vest in the State. The appellant's 
writ petition, coming up for hearing after this amendment, was dismill8Cd. 
An appeal !:> the Division Bench. also failed. Appeal before the Supreme 
Court came by virtue of a certificate of fitness under Article 133 (I)( c) of 
the Constitution. 
The question for consideration was whether the terms of section 5(aa) 
were sufficient and apt to provide for the vesting of the right to cut the 
r.- when such right belonged, on the date of vesting, not to the inter-
mediary or zamindar but to another person to whom it bad been granted 
under a contract with the said intermediary. 
HELD: (i) The words "together with" used in section 5(aa), on the 
basis <if which it was contended by counsel for the appellant that it wns 
only where the right to the trees constituted an integral part of the right to 
the land that ·a vesting was effected of the latter right, meant in the context 
of the section no more than the expression 'as well as'. and imported no 
condition that the right to the trees shoulll also belong to the owner of the 
land. Also, it was not possible to read the words uheld by an intermediary 
2 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1965) l Sf.R. 
or any other person" to mean rhat they were applicable only to cases where 
the entirety of the inletcst--to the land, to the trees, and to the produce--
were vested in a single person-be he the intermediary or another penon. 
These words would obviously apply equally to cases where the land belonged 
to an intermediary and the right to the trees or to the produce of the trees 
to anolher peI"on. In con•truing the section, moreover, the fact that ii 
\\'as amended to overcome certain decisions rendered under the original 
enactment was not an irrelevalll factor to be rakcn into account. (4E-G; 
58-D, 5G]. 
(ii) From the mere fact that there was no provision in the Acr for 
compensating the interest of persons like the appellant, the Court could 
not hdld that such an interest was not within fie vesting section--11ection 
S(Oll). The absence of a provision for compcnsarion might render the 
vesting section unconstitutional, but it could not detract from the clear 
operation of the words US<"d in section 5(aa). After the rassing Of the 
17tb 

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