RAM JAG AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF U.P.
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A B c D F G H RAM JAG AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF U.P. December 21, 1973 [M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] 9 Penal Code-Ss. 302, 32S, 323-i::o11stitt1tioll of India-Art. 136-High Co11rt set1ti11,~ aside acquittal-Appeal b)' special leave-If Supre1ne Court could reappreciate e1•ide11ce. Tbe appellants who were charged with the offence of murder were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge but the order of acquittal was set aside in appeal by the High Court. The High Court convicted them under various sections of the Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment for the offence of murder and to shorter tcnns for the other offences. The prosecution case was that when the deceased, along with three other persons, was returning from temple, he was attacked at about 4 P. M. on the day of the occurrence by the appellants. The deceased, who was mortally injured, was carried in a bullock cart to a nearby police station. On the way he succumbed. to his injuries. The first information report was lodged in the police station at 12 ·30 that night. Allowjng the appeal to this Court, HELD : This Court in an appeal under Art. 136 will examine lhe cvid1:nce only if the High Court while setting aside the order of acquittal by the trial court has failed to apply correctly the principles governing appeals against acquittals. In S/teo Swarup & Ors v. The King Emperor, 61 I.A. 398, Surajpal Sb1gh r. The State (19521 S.C.R.193 and Samvat Singh v. State ~f Rajasthan [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120, the principles governing appeals against· acquittal are firmly established. The Cede of Criminal Proc!dure m1de no di~tinction b~tween the powers of the appellate court in regard to the two categoties of appeals and, therefore, the High Court has powers as full and wide in appeals against acquittal as in appeals against con~ viction. Whether the High Court is dealing with one class of appeals of criminal jurisprudence that unless th~ statute provides to the contrary there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and secondly that the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt. Due regard to the views of the trial court as to the credibility of wit~s in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence :.ind the studied slowness of the appeUate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, where such seeing and hearing can be useful aids to the assessment or evidence are well known principles which generally inform the administration of justice and govern the exercise of all appellate jurisdiction. They are sclf~imposed limitations on a power otherwise plenary cmd 1ike all voluntary restrainls, they constitute valuable guidelines. Such regard and slowness must find their reflection in the appellate judgment, "1hich can only be if the appellate court deals \vith the principal reasons that inftuenced the order of acquittal and after examining the evidence with care gives its own reasons justifying a contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit in this judicial process that if two views of the evidence arc reasonably possible, the finding of acquittal ought not to be disturbed. If after applying these principles, not by their n1echanic.:1.l recitation in the judgment, the Hiah Court has reached the conclusion that the order of acquit~ tal ought to be reversed, this court will not reappraise Cvidence in appeals bro~t before it under art. -136 of the Constitution. In such appeals, only such examination of the evictence would ordinarily be necessary as is required to see whether the High Court has applied the principles correctly. The High Court is the final court of facts and the reserve jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136, though couched in wide terms, is by long practice exercised in exceptional cases where the Hi&h O>\lfl has disreg~ed the guidelines set by this Court for deciding appeals against acquittal or ''by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation or the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done", or where the finding is such that it shakes the conscicm;c of the court. (lSB~G] 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974) 3 S.C.R. The lligh Court in the instant case was evidently aware of these principles but it failed to apply the1n to the case on hand. The High Court was not corre<:t in characterising of the fin
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