RAM DAS ALIAS RAM SURAJ versus SMT. GANDIABAI AND ORS.
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β’ RAM DAS ALIAS RAM SURAJ A v . SMT. GANDIABAI AND ORS. NOVEMBER 20, 1996 [N.P. SINGH AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] B Code of Civil Procedure, I 908: Section I 00 : Second appeal-Interference with findings of fact by first appellate court by High Court-Finding of fact recorded-By first appellate court on reappreciation of evidence that plaintiff was not adopted by his stepfather C before remarriage of plaintiffs mother with his stepfather-However, first appellate court did not consider circumstance of incurring expenses by stepfather on occasion of marriage of plaintiff's sister while deciding question of plaintiff's adoption-Held: It had to be shown that finding of fact by the first appellate court was affected by any of errors as contemplated D by S. 100(/)(a), (b) & (c)-Such a pure finding offoct neither contrary to law nor to any usage having force of/aw, nor vitiated by failure to determine any 1naterial issue of la1v or usage, nor vitiated by substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by CPC or by any other law for the time being in force which might possibly have produced error or defect in the decision on this queslion---Tl111s none oflhe grounds contemplated by Section E 100(/)(a), (b) and (c) existed on record of the case-However, non- consideralion of circumstance of incurring marriage expenses by stepfalher lo/ally, irrelevant of deciding question of plaintiffs adoption-Since no material evidence having a direct impact on the decision of the case on merits was ignored by the first appellate court as final court of facts while arriving at the finding of plaintiff's adoption, High Court no/ legally justified F in inte1fering with clear finqling of fact arrived al by first appellate court in favour of plaintiff on issue of adoption and first appellate court ',Β·finding that plaintiff was not adopted mus/ be lreated to have been finally established on record-Hindu Law-Adoption. The appellant--plaintitrs grandfather died leaving behind two sons, the respondent-defendant and the plaintitrs father. The plaintifrs father died leaving behind the plaintiff as his son, a daughter and his widow. The plaintiff was six months old when his father died. As the plaintiff was a minor the properties after the death of G his father used to be managed by the defendant as 'Karla' of the H 829 830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. A family. Property was thus in joint possession of the parties. After attaining majority plaintiff sought for partition and separate possession of his one half share which the defendant refused. The plaintiff, therefore, filed a suit against the respondent-defendant for partition and separation of his half share in the properties. B The defence of the defendant was three-fold. Firstly, plaintifrs mother got remarried and plaintiff was given in adoption to his stepfather before her remarriage with him and consequently plaintiff had ceased to belong to the family of defendant and his deceased father and hence he had no right, title or interest in the suit properties. Secondly, during the lifetime of the plaintiff's father there was C partition of properties and, therefore, also plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the suit properties. Thirdly, the defendant had become owner of suit properties by adverse possession. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal the first appellate court reversed the findings of the Trial Court on the first and second D issues. However, the First Appellate Court confirmed the decree of dismissal of the suit on the third ground. On second appeal, the High Court reversed the findings of the First Appellate Court on the second and third issues. However, the E High Court noted that the first appellate court omitted to take into account the circumstance that the marriage of the plaintifrs sister was performed not by the defendant but by the plaintifrs stepfather which showed that the plaintiff was adopted by the stepfather and on this sole ground dismissed the second appeal. Being aggrieved the appellant-plaintiff preferred the present appeal. F On behalf of the appellant-plaintiff it was contended that the High Court should not have dismissed the second appeal by interfering with a pure finding of fact reached by the final court of facts on the question of adoption as such an exercise was not G permissible under Section I 00 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Allowing the app
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