RAM BHAWAN SINGH AND ORS. versus JAGDISH AND ORS.

Citation: [1990] 3 S.C.R. 957 · Decided: 22-08-1990 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: N.M. KASLIWAL · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

/ 
RAM BHAWAN SINGH AND ORS. 
A 
v. 
JAGDISH AND ORS. 
AUGUST 22, 1990 
[N.M. KASLIWAL AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.] 
B 
Transfer of Property Act, Section 43 Estoppel by deed doctrine. 
inapplicable if the transfer is invalid. 
U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1954, Section 9-Claiming 
tenancy rights-Question of applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation 
Act, 1963. 
The land in plots Nos. 6385 and 6386 had Ileen in possession of 
Ram Dayal as mortgagee under Baijnath who was the original tenant . 
c 
..,... 
Respondents No. 1-3 are the descendants of Ram Dayal. They made an 
application under section 9 of U .P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 
D 
before the Consolidation Officer claiming tenancy rights on the basis of 
the deed dated July 30, 1945, stating that their names had been 
recorded in Khatauni of 1359 Fasli. They are in cultivatory possession 
and have become adhivasis and subsequently sirdars. They further con-
tended that the appellants have no right of possession over the land and 
their names have been wrongly entered in the Khatauni No. 1353 Fasli. 
E 
_, The respondents prayed for entering their names as sirdars. 
This application was allowed by the Consolidation Officer vide 
order dated Joly 23, 1967. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) 
reversed the order and the Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed 
-A-,-
the revision filed by the respondents. 
F 
Subsequently the respondents filed a writ petition in the High 
{ 
Court. The High Court allowed the same and quashed the orders of the 
' appellate and the revisional authorities, and maintained the order of the 
Consolidation Officer in its judgment dated 3rd October, 1972. 
The appellants filed a special leave on 30th November, 1972 
against the judgment of the High Court dated 3rd October, 1972 under 
letters patent. It was not maintainable in view of the U.P. Courts (Abo-
lition of Letters Patent Appeal Amendment) Ordinonce, 1972 which 
"" 
came into force on 30th June, 1972. Thus Writ Petition finally cul-
G 
minated in favour of the respondents by High Court order dated 3rd 
H 
October, 1972. 
957 
A 
B 
c 
958 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 
The appellants instead of challenging the order of the High Court 
by way of filing any Special Leave Petition before this Court, initiated 
fresh proceedings by moving an application on 6th July, 1973 before the 
Settlement Officer (Consolidation) which was rejected on 30th October, 
1974. A revision was tiled against the said order before the Deputy 
Director of Consolidation which was also rejected on 21st July, 1975. 
Thereafter the appellants moved the High Court again, and the Writ Peti-
tion filed by them was dismissed by its order dated 18th September, 1975. 
Since the subject matter had been finally decided by the High 
Court judgment of 3rd October, 1972 so to start proceedings afresh was 
not in good faith as none of the authorities of the Settlement or Consoli-
dation could have any right or jurisdiction to set aside the order of the 
High Court. The second judgment of the High Court dated 18th 
September, 1975 was challenged in C.A. No. 1003 of 1976 in this Court. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, 
D 
HELD: Both the appeals had been tiled after the expiry of the 
period of limitation. The appellants had applied for condonation of 
delay on the ground that they had been prosecuting the prior proceed-
ings in good faith and on legal advice so the period of more than three 
years be excluded in computing the period of limitation under section 14 
of the Limitation Act 1963. The Respondents tiled counter to the appli-
E 
cation and opposed the same. [96ID-E] 
F 
Special leave was granted by this Court on 2nd September, 1976 
subject to the rights of the respondents to argue t~uestion of limita-
tion and applicability of section 14 of the Limitation Act at the hearing of 
the appeals. [961F] 
The appellants as to the question of limitation submitted that the 
delay of 1198 days had occurred unwillingly though they had been 
prosecuting with due diligence before the appellate authorities but there 
is no proper affidavit either of the appellants or the Counsel in support 
of the application for condonation of delay. There is also no other 
G 
material to indicate that the appellants had exercised due diligence in 
working out their remedies and sought proper advice in the matter. 
There was no right of appeal against the judgment of the High Court as 
it quashed the orders of

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