RAM BALI RAJBHAR versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

Citation: [1975] 3 S.C.R. 63 · Decided: 20-12-1974 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

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RAM BAU RAJBHAR 
v. 
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. 
December 20, 1974 
[M. H. BEG, Y. V. Cf!ANDRACHUD AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.J 
Maintenance of internal Securily Act-Public order-Section 14 read with 
Sec. 21 of the General clauses. Act~its scope. 
The petitioner was detained under MISA on the g.l'ounds that on 2 occasions, 
he along with his associates, hurled bombs on a tea-stall and on a watch· 
repai~ing shop, thereby damaging furniture, w~tches showcas.es etc., endang~ring 
the hves and sa·fety of the people; and creating a great disturbance of public 
order. 
In a habeas corpus petition, the petitioner challenged the grounds of deten-
tion as "Vague, falS4:, malafide, fanciful & non-existant," that there was no 
rational nexus between the grou.nds with permissible objects of 
preventive 
detention and that the offences mentioned in the ground could be the subject· 
matter of ordinary criminal prosecutions but not of public order, the breach 
of which is something more serious than mere breach of the Criminal Law 
of the land. 
Dismissing the petition, 
HELD : ( 1) "Public Order" is necessarily an elastic concept which is wider 
tha:n the "security of the State"-a category separated in the Act from it by 
the disjunctive "or." [66B] 
(2) In some cases, the facts may clearly indicate that an ordinary .criminal 
prosecution would suffice and the present case, is not one of those cases. 
[66CJ 
1 (3) In a case of detention, the Court has to ·l)e 
.careful 
to 
avoid 
substituting its own opinion about wha.t is enough for the subjective satisfaction 
of the detaining authorities, and interference could be justified only if it is 
clear that no reasonable person could possibly be satisfied about the need to 
detain the person on the ground served. The required satisfaction must have 
reference to a need to prevent what is anticipated from the detenu. The past 
conduct or· activity is only relevant in so far as it furnished reasonable grounds. 
for an apprehension. Prevention and punishment have some common ultimate 
aims but their immediate objectives and modes of action are distinguishable. [66D] 
( 4) In the present case, the petitioner was given a personal hearing bi 
the Advisory Board. . The Board heard another detenu. who was released fater. 
The Board did not think that the petitioner should be released. It shows that 
the Advisory Boa~d did apply its mind to the case of the petitioner. [67H] 
(,5) & regards non-application of the minds of the detaining authorities, 
the facts of the case speak otherwise. As regards the affidavit sworn by the 
Tea-shop owner whose shop WM attacked, that the petitioner did not attack 
his shop, were considered by a division bench of the Calcutta High Court 
and it rightly held that the affidavit could not vitiate the initial detention order 
which wa~ passed at a time when no such affidavit was either before the 
detaining authorities or placed before the Advisory Board. [68D] 
( 6) So far as the second representation of the petitioner to the State Govt. 
is concerned, under Sec. 14 of the Act, the State C.:ivt. can revoke or modify 
a detention order at any time. 
Sec. 14 of the Act apparently vests a wider 
power than that which the State Govt. may have possessed under Sec. 21 
of the General Clauses Act 1897, which is by having been specificaliy men-
tioned in Sec. 14 of the Act, makes it clear the power under Sec. 14 is not 
necessarily subject to the provision of Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. 
This means that a revocation or modification of an order of the State Govt. 
64 
SUP~BME C9:lJRT REPORTS 
(1975] 3 s.c.R. 
is possible even without complying with the restriction laid down in Sec. 21 
of the General Clauses Act; but a correct interpretation of the two provisions 
would be that it is left to the State Govt. in the exercise oI it3 discretion, 
either to exercise the power read with provisions of Sec. 21 of the General 
Clauses Act or without the aid of Sec. 21. 
[69B-D] 
(7) Further, it will be reasonable that judicious exercise of the power under 
Sec. 14 of the Act to refer a case once again to the Advisory Board for its 
opinion before the subsequent representation made on fresh material by a 
detenu is rejected and 1he Advisory Board can then adopt such parts of the 
pro:edure laid down in Sec. 11 of the Act as could be appJic,d to a second 
representation. [69E-F; 708) 
( 8) On a habea5 corpus petition, what has to be considered by the Cou
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