RAJNIKANT versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1971] 2 S.C.R. 529 · Decided: 30-09-1970 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.M. SIKRI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

I 
A 
B 
529· 
RAJMKANT 
v. 
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
September 30, 1970 
[S. M. SlKRI, K. S. HEGDE AND I. D. DuA, JJ,] 
Appeal-Conviction under Ss. 326 a11d 324 I.P.C.-High Court' dis-
mjssing appeal .su111marily without giving any reason-_// desirable cours¢-
Necessity for giving reasons to enable Supren1e Court properly to· exercise 
its power under Article 136 of the Cqnstitution, 
C 
The appellant was convicted by the Trial court for offences under 
Sections 326 and 324 I.P.C. for having voluntarily caused grievous hurt 
-
with a dangerous weapon to one person, and for 'causing hurt to three 
other persons. 
He was sentenced to imprisonment for four years for his 
conviction under Sectiun 326 and for 1! years for each of the three 
offences 11r,Jt:r Section 324, all sentences to run concurrently. 
The ap-
pellant filed an appeal against his conviction to the High Court at Bombay 
0 
but his appeal was dismissed by the Court with one word "dismissed". 
In appeal to this 
Court by special leave 
under 
Article 
136, it· 
was contended on behalf of the appellant that the injuries complained of 
were inflicted by him in the exercise of his lawful and legitimate right 
of self-defence. 
It ~1.as also contended that the statements of three of 
the eye witnesses made in the committing Court from which they-had 
resiled at the trial should not have been acted upon by the Trial Court 
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in support of the prosecution version; and that the only witness who did 
not resile from the. statement in the committing Court was._ a highly in-
terested witness in that he was the person' on whom injuries were stated h> 
have been inflicted by the appellant: therefore his evidence should not· 
have been implicitly accepted. 
F 
G 
.H 
HELD : dismissing the appeal, 
(i) Oi:t the evidence, the plea of self defence taken by the appellant 
could not be sustained. 
Furthermore the statements of the three witnesses 
in the committing court from which they resiled at the trial and which 
were duly brought on the record of the trial court under. Section 288 
Cr. P.C. constituted substantive evidence and if the court was satisfied 
that those statements were true whereas those made in the trial court were 
untrue, then the earlier statements could safely be relied upon to sustain 
the conviction. 
In this case a mere reading of the statements at the trial 
demonstrated their unconvincing nature and it was clear that there was 
some u1terior motive for the witnesses to resite from the earlier state-
ments which appeared to have a ring of truth about them. The trial 
court was therefore right in convicting the appellant for offences under 
Ss. 326 and 324 I.P.C. J;536 B-D] 
(ii) On reading the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge 
and the memorandum of the grounds of appeal in the High Court it 
was clear that the· summary dismissal of the appeal by the High Court · 
with -one word "dismissed" without 
indicating its views on the points 
raised in the appeal which appeared to be arguable was not right. This 
530 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1971) 2 S.C.R. 
•Court has repeatedly pointed out that when an appeal to the High Court 
A 
u!lder the Code of Criminal Procedure raises some arguable points. the 
High Court would be well-advised to give some indication of the reasons 
for its view while repelling those points. 
Without having the benefit of 
the opinion of the High Court, this Court is likely to feel embarrassed in 
dealing with those points on appeal by special leave, [530 H-531 CJ 
Mustak Hussein v, The State of Bombay, [1953] S.C.R. 809 at 820 
and Challappa Ramaswami v. State of Maharashtra [1970] (2) S.C.R. 426; 
B 
referred to. 
Section 4!0 Cr.P.C. confers a right of appeal to the High Court on 
a person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional 
Sessions Judge. This right entitles the aggrieved party to challenge con-
clusions of facts and to claim reappraisal of evidence. 
It would, there-
fore, be conducive to the ends of justice if the High Courts were as a 
general rule to let this Court have the benefit of their valuable opinion 
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in cases which raise arguable points whether on facts or on law so as 
to enable this Court satisfactorily to exercise its power under Art. 136 
and dispose of the appeal finally. 
[In order to avoid further delay in 
the disposal of the present case the Court decided to go into the evi-
dence-a course this Court is 
normally reluctant to adopt in 
appeals 
under Art. 136-

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