LexRAJKUMARI KAUSHALYA DEVI versus BAWA PRITMA SINGH AND ANOTHER.
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1960 Sftaorji Vatlabhdas & Co. v. Commissioner of lucome-laxf Excess Profits T1,x, Bombay S . .K. Das J. 1960 A.fHif 20 570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960] India. As to t.hc t.hir<l mauaged company whose business was stevedoring and t.rading and t.hc remun- eration was payable at 2:"i per cent. of the net profits, there can be no doubt that the remuneration accrued at Bombay. Therefore, the High Court of Bombay correctly answerc<l the question against. the appellant. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with cusr.s. A j1j1eal dismissed. R/\JK!;f\JARI KAUSHALYA DE\11 v. BAWA PRJJ":'.JA SINGH AND ANOTHER. (P. B. GAJEXDRAGADKAR, K. N. \VAl'\CHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Mortgage-Whether a "pecuniary liability"-The Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act (LX X of 1951), ss. 2(6), sub-els. (a) (b) (c) 13, 15, 16(5), 17, 21. The appellant executed two usufructuary mortgages in favour of the respondents in 1946 with respect to two properties ' . - situated in Ferozepur city and herself took the properties on lease ..... on the same date. 1~he respondents filed an application- under s. 13 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, LXX of 1951, for recovery of the principal sum due and also the arrears of rent. The appellant contested the application on the ground, 1'"7·~ inter alia, that the liability was not a debt under the Act as it "' was not a pecuniary liability and that mortgages in relation to properties situated now in India were not covered by it. The Tribunal allowed the application and passed a preliminary decree for sale. The appellant's appeal to the High Court and another under the Letters Patent were both dismissed. On appeal by special leave: Held, that a mortgage debt would create a pecuniary liabi- lity upon the 1nortgagor and would be covered bv, the definition of the word "debt" in s. 2(6) of the Act. There is nothing in any provision of the Act which would cut down the plain meaning of the words "pecuniary liability" as used in s. 2(6) read with sub-cl. (c) thereof or restrict those wide words to liability other than that secured by a mortgage. Under sub-cl. (c) o[ s. 2(6) a displaced person to whom a mortgage debt is due f rorn any or her person, whether a displaced ,. person or not, ordinarily residing in the territories to which the Act extends can take the benefit of this Act. - ' _> 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 571 The interest of the prior mortgagee or the subsequent mort- gagee if any would not be affected by a decree passed on an application under s. 13 of the Act. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 6, 1958, of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 52 of l C)i)4, arising out of the judgment and order elated June Fi, 1954, of the said High Court· in First Appeal from Order No. 149 of 1953. Y. Kumar, for the appellant. Bakshi Man Singh and Sardar Singh, for the respondents. 1960. April 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by \VANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Punjab High Court. The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. The appellant had executed two usufructuary mort- gages with respect to two properties situate in Feroze- pore citv in favour of the respondents in J 946. She also took both properties on lease on the same date. An application was filed by the respondents under s. 13 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, >Jo. LXX of J 951 (hereinafter called the Act), for recovery of the principal sum due as well as the rent which was said to be in- arrears. The application was resisted by the appellant on various grounds, one of which was that no snch application lay as the liability was not a debt under the Act. The tribunal negatived the contention of the appellant and passed a prelimi- nary decree for sale. Six month's time was allowed to the appellant to pay the decretal amount, failing which the respondents were at liberty to get a final decree prepared and bring the properties to sale. The appellant went in appeal to the High Court but the appeal was dismissed. Then there was a Letters Patent Appeal, which was also dismissed. The appel- lant then applied for and was granted special leave bv this Court, and that is how the matter has come UJJ before us. Th
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