RAJINDER versus STATE OF HARYANA

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 5 · Decided: 05-06-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

RAJINDER. 
A 
v. 
STATE OF HARYANA 
JUNE 5, 2006 
[ARJJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.] 
B 
Penal Code, 1860: 
Sections 304-11 and 302-Culpable homicide-Accused caused death of 
PW8 's nephew by using fire-arm-Deceased suffered thigh injury which the C 
Doctor opined was dangerous to life-Deceased succumbed to the injury 
subsequently-Held: Courts below erred in convicting accused under s.302. 
!PC-Conviction under s. 304-11 with custodial sentence of seven years justified 
in facts and circumstances of the case-Arms Act, 1959-Section 27. 
Sections 299 & 300-'Murder' and 'Culpable homicide not amounting 
to murder-Distinction between-Corresponding clauses of ss.299 and 300 
discussed. 
According to the prosecution, Appellant killed the nephew of PW8 
D 
by firing gunshot as he suspected that the deceased gave secret information E 
against him to the police. ,\ppellant also bore grudge against the deceased 
as his father took on lease land belonging to the Appellant's brother. 
The incident occurred at night when deceased and PW8 were going 
by the side of their village. Deceased suffered thigh injury, which the 
Doctor opined was dangerous to life. He subsequently succumbed to the F 
injury in the hospital. Prosecution examined 14 witnesses. PW8 was stated 
to be eye-witness. Trial Court convicted Appellant under Section 302 IPC 
and under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. The conviction was upheld 
by the High Court. Hence the present appeal. 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 
'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. 
Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of 
5 
G 
H 
6 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose 
of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, 
the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first 
is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the 
gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 
'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second 
B degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there 
is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of 
culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest 
among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide 
of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 
C 
(11-F-H; 12-A) 
2.1. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable 
homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The 
safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these 
provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various 
D clauses of Sections 299 and 300. (12-8, CJ 
2.2. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) 
of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under 
clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the 
particular victim being in such. a peculiar condition or state of health that 
E the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the 
fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient 
to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. The 'intention 
to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the 
intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's 
F knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the 
particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this 
clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended 
to Section 300. (13-C, DJ 
2.3. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge 
G on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of 
Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow 
intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged 
liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause 
death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or 
H spleen or the failure of the hea1rt, as the case may be. If the assailant had 
no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the \'ictim, nor 
; 
RAJINDER v. STATEOFHARYANA 
7 
an intention to 

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