RAJINDER SINGH @ KADA versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1992] 2 S.C.R. 574 · Decided: 21-04-1992 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. PUNCHHI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
RAJINDER SINGH @ KADA 
v. 
~ 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
APRJL 21, 1992 
B 
[MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND B.J~. JEEVEN REDDY, JJ.] 
Criminal Law: 
)...-
Indian Penal Code, 1860-Section 302-0ffence of Murder-Presence 
c of eye witnesses at the scene of occu"ence not free from doubt-Investigation 
in doubt as to the culprit-Introduction of second dying declaration with 
names of eye witnesses-Despatch of FIR after recording of second dying 
declaration-Contradictions in two dying declarations-Investigation not free 
from taint-Material witnesses-Not examined-Whether High Court justified 
~ 
D 
·in reversing trial court's decision acquitting the accused-Absconding of ac-
cused-Whether per se establishes guilt-Whether accused entitled to benefit 
of doubt. 
The .appellant was alleged to have fired a shot from his pistol hitting 
the left flank or one 'C' who rushed inside PW .3's house and b.id himself 
E 
by chaining the door from inside. PW .3 and another person raised alarm, 
but the appellant escaped from the place or occurrence with his pistol. 
PW.4 who had also arrived at the spot .saw the occurrence. While PW .3 
went to the village Police Station and lodged the First Information Report, 
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two other persons took the injured person to the City Civil Hospital, where 
F 
PW .2, the doctor, attended on the injured person, who remained in the 
hospital for about 13 days, and ultimately succumbed to the injury. PW.2, 
who performed the autopsy or the deceased, opined that the d1!8th was due 
to toxemia and shock resulting from peritonitis, as a consequence of fire 
arm injury in which the small gut was injured, and that tb.e injury was 
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course or nature. 
,0-
G 
The appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of 
the Arms Act, 1959, for the murder and. for making use of a pistol for an 
unlawful purl>ose.·The appellant was declared absconder. He was arrested 
when in possessiob -Ota·i>istol 40 months after the incident. 
H 
The prosecution supported its case .by production of two eye wit· 
f-
514 
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v 
RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE 
575 
nesses, PWs 3 and 4. It also introduced two dying declarations, one A 
recorded by PW.14, the then Executive Magistrate, and the second 
recorded . by PW.15 the S.I. of Police Station of the village in which the 
incident took place. Besides, the fact of accused's absconding after the 
incident was also pressed into service. The Sessions Judge, placed no 
reliance either of the occular version or the dying declarations and ac-
quitted the appellant. However, on appeal, by the State, the High Court set 
aside the acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and 
Section 27 of the Arms Act, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and 
B 
a fine of Rs.2,000 and, in default, a further perio~ of one year's rigorous 
imprisonment and also one year's rigorous imprisonment respectively. 
Allowing the appeal of the accused, by giving benefit of doubt, this 
court, 
c 
HELD: 1.1 The presence of the two witnesses, PWs. 3 and 4, at the 
scene of occurrence is not free from doubt. The investigation was in doubt D 
as to who was the culprit. As a first step, the theory of the first dying 
declaration was introduced without taking somebody independent, like the 
doctor, into confidence. The investigation later introducted the story of 
another dying declaration. This one was with the aid of the doctor, but this 
brought in the names of the two eye-witnesses to figure at a time when 
everything was manageable from the official point of view in reporting the E 
matter to the l\fagistrate. The investigation also, in the instant case, 
therefore, is not free from taint. The High Court, therefore, was not right 
in setting aside the trial court's decision and convicting the appellant. 
(584 F~H, 585 A] 
F 
1.2 There are contrasting features in the two dying declarations. The 
presence of PW .3 and PW.4 at the scene of occurrence had not been men-
tioned specifically in the first dying declaration. HoWever, their names got 
introduced in the second dying· declaration. Besides, the brother of the 
appellant had been introduced in the second dying declaration as a co-
culprit. Though the City Police was present in attendance at the hospital, G 
after it had been informed of the arrival of the injured there, it was not 
prepared to carry the burden of getting recorded a dying declaration. In this 
situation, it is rather dramatic that PW.14 should jump

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