RAJENDRA PRASAD versus STATE OF BIHAR

Citation: [1977] 3 S.C.R. 68 · Decided: 25-02-1977 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

68 
A 
RAJENDRA PRASAD 
v. 
STATE OF BIHAR 
February 25, 1977 
B 
(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SH!NGHAI.. JJ.J 
c 
:H 
Crin1i11a! J!rocedure.. Code 1898-Powers of Hi/~h Court to set aside ocq11ittal 
-Whetl!er n:1al Cf!Ul'l 111dgn1e11t should be palpably 1\'rong-Credibility of witness 
-Test 1dent1ficat1011 parade-Delay in. 
F.l.R.-Ahsence to na111e acc11sed-/j co1n•ictio11 ca11 be bnsed 011 sole testi~ 
111011y of a witness. 
P. W. 9 Sabir aged about 18 year \Vent to the 
house of Lala 
(deceased) 
\vho used to render physicril training and swin1ming lessons to young boys and 
requested Lala to accon1pany hirn to the b<ink of a river. 
\\'hen 
Lala 
was 
cleaning his teeth and washing his fncc the appellant \\Cnt there \Vith 4 or 5 
rersons. ·The prosecution case is thrit those 4 or 5 persons engngcd Lala in 
talk and the appellant thn1~t a dagger on the back of Lala who died within 
minutes after the assault. 
20 to 25 persons who were there and P.\V. 9 and 
others ran behind the appellant. 
The prosecution exan1inccl 13 witnesses out 
of \Vhieh 4 'vere cyc-\vitnesses, na1nely, P.W. 1. 4. 9 and 10. 
The Sessions 
Judge disbelieved all the eye 
V11itnesscs, and acquitted 
the 
appellant. 
The 
Sessions Judge while <icquitting the :ippellant took the fol'Jo\ving facts into 
consideration :-
( 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
( 4) 
P.\V. 4 who lodged the First Tnforn1ation Report did not na1ne any 
<iccuscd and, in f<ict. he did not know the <1ccused before the occu-
rrence nnd could not even 
identify hin1 at 
the 
test 
identification 
parnde. 
V. \Vs 
1 nnd 10 had opportunity to see the accused before and 
therefore the test identification parade could not be attached much 
significance. 
P. \Vs 1 nnd 2 are supposed to hnve seen the accused at the time 
when he was running a\vay fron1 the place 
of 
occurrence 
and, 
therefore, it \V!!S highly ,improbable that they V11ould be able to retain 
1he i1nprcssion of the accused. 
It is highly improbable that P.\V. 9 hnd seen the incidC'nt since he 
did not go to the Police Station nor even s!ayed at the 
place 
of 
occurrence till the arrival of the police. 
On the other hand. he 
confined hi1nself in his house until a constable came to take him 
to the police station. 
The police in the beginning 
Sll"o~cted him 
as one of the persons who participCJtcd 
in 
the 
nnirder 
of 
the 
deceased. 
His conduct is very sllspicious. 
The I-ligh 
Court in appeal by the State relied on the evidence of P.\V. 
~ 
ns being corroborated by P. Vls. l and 10. 
The 
1-Tigh 
Court thrrefore, set 
aside the ncquittal and convicted the· accused under s. 302 l.P.C. rind sentenced 
him to rigorous in1prison1ncnt for life. 
Allovvino- the appeal under s. 2(a) of the Supre1ne C:ourt (Enl<irgement of 
Criminal A'Prc<1l Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. 
HELD : (I) When a trial court, with full view of the witnesses. acquits 
an accused after disbeliev~ng direct. testin1ony it will_ b~ essential for the !Jigh 
Court in nn appeal against ricqu1ttal to clea·rly 1nd1cate firn1 and weighty 
grounds fro1n the record for discarding the reasons of the trial ccurt in or~er 
to be able to reach a cont1;ary con_clu~io~ of guilt of the ace;used. 
The High 
court should be able to point ont in 11s JtKlgmcnt that the tnal court re-no;ons 
' 
• • 
RA.JENDRA PRASAD v. BJllAR (Goswami, J.) 
69 
are palpably and unerringly shaky and 
its 
own 
reasons 
arc 
demonstrably 
A. 
cogent. 
As a salutary rule of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against 
.acquittal it is not legally sufficient that it is just possible for the High Court 
10· take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses but it is absolutely 
-imperative that the lfigh Court convincingly finds it \Yell-nigh impossible for 
the trial court.to reject their testi1nony. 
l74 A-C] 
(2) This is not a case where 
it can be said that the Sessions Judge came 
to a palpably wrong conclusion on the evidence or that the reasons for 
.ncquittal of the accused are manifestly erroneous, shocking one's sense of 
B 
justice. 
The H.igh Court \Vas not right in interfering with the acquittal of the 
accused in this case. r74-Dl 
(3) Since the Sessions Cou1t and the High Court reached different con-
.clusions from the same evidence this Court \Vent lhrcugh the entire evidence 
carefully in order to see \Vhcther the appreciation of the evidence by the 
Sessions Judge was so unreasonable and unrealistic as to entitle the High Court 
to interfere \vith the same. r?OE-F] 
' 
CR

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