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RAJENDERA NATH KAR versus GANGADAS & GANGADHAR RATHI & ORS.

Citation: [1979] 2 S.C.R. 945 · Decided: 12-01-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: Y.V. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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945 
RAJENDERA NATH KAR 
v. 
GANGADAS & GANGADHAR RATH! & ORS. 
January 12, 1979 
tY. V. CllANDRACHUD, C.J., V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.) 
Wes/ Bengal Pre1nises Tenancy A.ct, 1956-Scope of Stctions 11A and 39 
tr.ad with s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963-Condonation of delay does not 
»?.cal! t:Xl't'11Sion of the period of li1nitation prescribed under the Act. 
Jn the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the 
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, on the ground that the appellant 
was in arrears of rent, that he had sub-let the premises and that the respon-
dents required the premises for their personal use, the appellant deposited the 
arrears of- rent within a period of 30 days i.e. within the time but did not de-
posit th~ intn·est due on the arrears as required by s. 17(i) of the Act. 
The 
respondents therefore, filed an application 1:1-nder s. 17 (3) of the Act to strike 
off the appellant's defence for failure to deposit ·the interest. The said appli-
cation was accepted by the Trial Court and, therefore, the respondents filed a 
civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order which 
was dismissed on April 4, 1968. 
During the pendency of the said revision application, s. 17A was newly 
intrcduced in the 1956 Act with retrospect1\'c from 26-8-1967. 
By that 
section tenants v.1ere given the right, if the proceedings for eV-iction was 
not 
disposed of, to apply within 30 days of the said dttte for setting aside the 
order for .striking off the defence. Jn view of the challenge by wa'y of revi-
sion application in the High Court against the order striking off his defence -the 
aprclh1r,t did not take recourse to the provisions of the newly introduced 
s. 17 A of the West Bengal Premises T'enoocy Act. 
After the dismissal of the revision petition, the appellant filed an application 
under the ne\v s. 17A of the Act praying that the order dated July 25, 1963 
passed by the Trial Court, striking off his defence be set aside. 
A1ong with 
the 
~aid application. an application to condone the delay under Eection 
~ of 
the Limitation Act was also filed. The Trial Court tlism\ssed both the applica-
tions and the Hi£h Court confirmed that order in revision. 
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court 
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HELD : 1. The true meaning and effect of s. 39 is that if any special period 
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of limitation is prescribed by the Act, that period will govern the proceeding 
under the Act in preference to the period, if any, prescribed by the Limitation 
Act. 
But apart from such an over-riding effect of the period of limitation pres-
ciibcd by the Act, not only that the other provisions of the Limilation Act do 
not stand excluded or superseded, but they are expressly made applicable by 
s. 39 of the Act. [949 A-BJ 
2. Section 39 of the West Bengal Premises 1'enancy Act, 1956, which is 
clear and specific, leaves no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act 
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946 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 
would apply to proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, sub-
ject to the condition that if there is a provision in the West BCngal ·Act relat-
ing to J;mitatk1n, that provision \voul<l prevail over the provisions of the Indian 
Limitation Act relating to limitation. Since the West Bengal Act prescnOed 
a specific period of limitation for filing an application for scttlng aside an order 
st!ilting out the defence, namely a period of 30 days comn1encing on August 26. 
1967 'vhcn the first Ordinance came into force, that period would undoubtedly 
apply to the n1aking of the application under s. 17A of the Act. Since the 
appellant did not file bis application under s. 17A before the due date, that is 
to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must be held to be barred 
by ]imitation. But, by reason of s. 39 of the Act, all other provisions of the 
Limitation Act would be attracted including ''· 5 of the latter /\ct. [948 D-F] 
Jn the instant case since the appcllanl <lid not file his application under s. 
17A of the Aet, before the due date, thnt is to say, before September 25, 1967, 
the app1ication under s. 17A is barred by limtta-t:ions, 
Ho\vcvcr, the applica-
tion filed by him un<lcr s. 5 of the Lilnitation Act for condonation of delay 
is maintainable. [948 A-B, G] 
M/s. J>akarmal Gurudayal v. Sagannal Bengani 16 C.W.N. 486 
app:ovcd. 
3. When a Court condones the delay caused in

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