RAJENDER SINGH & ORS. versus SANTA SINGH & ORS.

Citation: [1974] 1 S.C.R. 381 · Decided: 16-08-1973 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: KUTTYIL KURIEN MATHEW · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

381 
A 
RAJENDER SINGH & ORS. 
v. 
SANTA SINGH & ORS. 
August 16, 1973 
[K. K. MATHEW AND M. ff. BEG, JJ.J 
B 
Lis pendens-Transfer of Property Act, (4 of 1882)-Sectio11 52-Whether 
arrestis "the running of the period of /imitation during the pendency of the suit. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Umi1ation Act (9 of 1908), Art. 142-Scope of. 
The respondents had filed a suit in 1940 claiming title to and possession of 
certain lands in the pos~ession of the appellants and the suit ended in favour of 
the appellants in 1958. 
Jn 1959. the appellar/s filed a suit for possession against the 
re·spondents 
asserting that the respondents had taken illegal and forcible possession of those 
lands after the decision of the High Court in 1958. The respondents, however,. 
claimed that they had taken possession of the lands even in 1944 and that they 
bad been sin.:e then in adverse possession openly, continuously and exclusively 
as owners. 
The trial court found that the respondents had been in possession of the lands 
from 1946· to the date of the appelJants' suit. The firsti appellate i;ourt, however, 
held that the doctrine of /is pendens prevented the rights of the respondents from 
maturing. The fligh Court, accepting the concurrent findings as to the iact of 
posses'lion of the respondents held that the adverse possession of the tleflCndants 
commenced during th!! pendency of the earlier suit and once having begUn to 
run would not stop running merely because of the pendency of the defendantis' 
suit for possession which was dismiissed in 1958. 
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that, 
(i) a portion of the lruid entered in revenue record as Banjar could not be 
adversely possessed at all and must be deemed to be in the possession of plain-
tiffs on the principle that possession follows title; 
(ii) Art. 141 of the Limitation Act was not applicable; and 
(iii) the doctrine of /is pend>ens CO"tained in s. 52 of the T.P. Act 
188Z 
arrested 1he running of the period of 1imitation during the pendency of the 
respondents' suit filed in 1940. 
Dismi,.;;ing the appeal, 
HELD: (I) It is not correct that b•njar land was incapable of adverse 
possession. Even if Banjar land could not be cultivated it was not per se incap-
able of being actually a.nd physically possessed by use for other purposes such 
as building or storing of wood or crops, apart from cultivation. Further, this 
question which involved investigation of fresh facts, was not raised in the court• 
below. [3850-E] 
· 
(2) (o) On the allegations of the ap~llants in their plaint of •lleged pesscs-
sion and dispossession, the case fell within the ambit of art. 
142, Limitation 
Act. The question whethe-r the suit was within time when assertions were made 
attracting the .ipplication of the article became a question of proof of title itself~ 
Without proof of subsisting title the suit must fail; [385F-G] 
Bindhva<lwl Chand & OrS v. Ram Gharib Chand & Oro, A.I.R. 1934 All. 
993 (F.ll.) approved. 
2(b) Tt is not necessary tha<t the issue frained must mention the provision Of 
law tc be applied. It is the duty of the court, in view of s. 3 of the Limitation 
Act, to npply the bar of limitation, whether on patent facts it is applicable even 
though not specifically pleaded. [386D-E] 
382 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
( 1974) l S.C.R. 
(3) (a) An c.\tinction of title will not be hit by the doctrine of /is pende11s 
simply b-;!cau·.;e it was an extin::tion during the pendency.~f a suit. If so \.Vide was 
1he sweep of ~. 52, Transfer of Property Act, the provision would 
have been 
differently worded. [386A-ll] 
( b) .f·urther such a case in \Vhich. the extinction of title took place by an 
applic1ttion of ihe specific afid mandatory provisions of the 
Limitation 
Act, 
would not b~ governed by provision of an Act relating to "transfer" as defined 
by ·s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act but by·the Limitation Act exdusively. 
(3868] 
Jayara111 Muda/iar v. Ayyaswan1j & Ors. [1972] 2 S.C.C. 200 followed. 
A 
B 
( c) The do::trine of /is pcndens was intended to strike at attempts by parties 
to a litigation to circumvent the jurisdiction of a court, in which a c!ispute on 
iights or interests in immovable property was pending by private dealings which 
niight ren1ove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of 
the, 
court's 
power to decide a pendnig dispute or frustrate its decree. Alienees acqu:ring any 
C 
hnmovabie property during a litigation over it were held to be boun_d,, by

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