RAJEEV GUPTA & ORS. versus PRASHANT GARG & ORS.
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2364 : 2025 INSC 552 Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 11061 of 2024) 23 April 2025 [Dipankar Dutta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the suit was barred by limitation; whether the sale deeds were void documents; whether the Will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved; whether the First Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation. Headnotesβ Limitation Act, 1963 β Arts.58, 59 and 65 β Transfer of Property Act, 1882 β ss.54, 41 β Suit for cancellation of sale deed and recovery of possession β Limitation period β Will allegedly executed by the common ancestor of the parties, bequeathing suit property in favour of his two sons-I and Dr.K, and third son was bequeathed business of pharmacy β Thereafter, a family settlement in 1956, the names of wife of I and the third son mutated in respect of the suit property, with remaining properties being allotted to Dr.K β Rounds of litigation between the family members qua ownership of the suit property β Ultimately, Dr.Kβs absolute right over the eastern portion of the suit property was accepted, third son was permitted to remain in possession thereof β Two sale deeds duly registered (qua the eastern and southern portions of the suit property) executed by the third son in favour of the appellants in 1992Β β Thereafter, suit filed by Dr.K and his son (plaintiffs) against the appellants seeking cancellation of the sale deeds and possession of the suit property β Subsequently, the plaint amended whereby new relief added to the effect that the suit is based on title, and recovery of possession is sought on the basis of title and by way of abundant precaution plaintiff seeks relief of cancellation β Trial Court dismissed the suit β First Appellate court allowed the suit and granted the reliefs *βAuthor [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2365 Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors. sought for β High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellants β Appeal before this Court, wherein issue arose whether the suit was barred by limitation; whether the sale deeds were void documents; whether the Will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved; and whether the First Appellate Court right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation: Held: Subject suit of the plaintiffs could not have succeeded β Trial court, was right in dismissing the suit β Impugned second appellate judgment and decree of the High Court and the first appellate judgment and decree of the first appellate court, both set aside and that of the trial court restored, dismissing the subject suit β As regards limitation, the limitation period would have to be adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation which is 3 (three) years, and not the ancillary relief of possession which is 12 (twelve) years β Limitation period prescribed for suits seeking cancellation of documents being 3 (three) years, despite the cause of action having arisen in 1992, the plaintiffs chose to institute the suit 11 (eleven) years later, the suit of the plaintiffs having been instituted in 2003, was hopelessly barred by limitation and s.3 of the Limitation Act essentially entails its dismissal β Appellants had been put in possession of the suit property in furtherance of the sale deeds executed by and between third son and the former after the same were registered β Hence, suit seeking declaration of status or right simplicitor would not have sufficed for the plaintiffs since admittedly, they were required to seek further relief β Composite suit seeking cancellation, recovery of possession and injunction is what was required to be instituted, as distinguished from a suit seeking only recovery of possession β Thus, cancellation was the primary relief in the circumstances with recovery of possession being the ancillary relief β Plaintiffs did have knowledge-constructive as well as actual during the pendency of the second suit or soon thereafter of transfer of the suit property in favour of the appellants effected by the third son by way of execution of the sale deeds β It is from such date of knowledge in June, 1992 that the said transfer effectively did invade or jeopardize the plaintiffsβ interest in respect of the suit propertyΒ β
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