RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANR. ETC. versus KRISHNA KANT ETC. ETC.

Citation: [1995] 3 S.C.R. 1118 · Decided: 03-05-1995 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: B.P. JEEVAN REDDY · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION 
AND ANR. ETC. 
v 
KRISHNA KANT ETC. ETC. 
B 
MAY 3, 1995 
[B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, SUHAS C. SEN AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.] 
Civil Procedure Code, 190S-Section '}-Jurisdiction of Civil Court vis-
a-vis Special Tribunals-Industrial Disputes-Concept of-Dispute between 
C employer and workmen involving recognition, application or enforcement of 
certified Standing Orders-Whether jurisdiction of Civil Court ba"ed-Effec-
tiveness of remedies provided by Industrial Disputes Act. 
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-Section 13-
A-Standing Order~ature of-Meaning and scope of Section 13-A-Cer-
D tified Standing Orders are statutorily imposed conditions of service-Binding 
both upon employers and employees-These do not amount to 'statutory 
provision'-Violation of-Remedy available. 
The respondents, employees of the appellant Corporation filed civil 
E suits for a declaration that the order terminating their services was illegal 
land invalid and for a further declaration that they must be deemed to 
have continued and were still continuing in the services or the Corporation 
with all consequential benefits. Pursuant to disciplinary inquiries held 
against them on charges or ciisconduct, their services were terminated. 
The Corporation resisted the suits on the ground that the Civil Court had 
F no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The suits were decreed as prayed for 
and the appeals as also second appeals filed by the Corporation were 
dismissed. Hence these appeals. 
The appellant Corporation urged that the disciplinary enquiries, 
which resulted in the dismissal of the respondents were conducted perfect-
G ly in accordance with the Standing Orders; that a suit of this nature is not 
maintainable in a civil court and the respondent's only remedy was to 
approach the Labour Court for the reliefs sought for by them in the suit 
as any and every violation of Standing Orders entitles the workman to 
approach the Labour Court directly u/s 13-A of the Industrial Employment 
H (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and ~btain relief and that the Labour Court 
1118 
RATASTHAN STATE RD. TPT. CORPN. v. KRISHNA KANT 
1119 
is empowered under this provision to adjndicate dispute between workmen A 
and employer arising from the certificated Standing Order and grant such 
relief as is appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
The respondents-workmen submitted that the certified Standing Or-
ders have statutory force and their violation enables the Civil Court to 
decree reinstatement in service and that bar of Section 14 of the Special B 
Relief Act did not operate in such a case. 
The question raised for consideration was whether by virtue of the 
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Standing Orders, the 
Civil Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of such suits is barred. 
Allowing the appeals, this Conrt 
c 
HELD : 1. Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., 
where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit 
filed in civil court cannot he said to be not maintainable, even though such D 
a dispute may also constitute an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of 
Section 2(k).or Section 2-A the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. [1139-G] 
2. Where, however, the dispute involves recogiiition, observance or 
enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial 
Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said E 
Act. [1139-HJ 
3. Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance 
or enforcement of right and obligations created by enactments like In-
dustrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called 
'sister enactments' to Indnstrial Disputes Act - and which do not provide F 
a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to ap-
proach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they 
constitnte industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Sec-
tion 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such 
dispnte shall be either treated as an industrial dispnte or says that it shall G 
be adjudicated by any of the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act. 
Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open. [1140-B-CJ 
4. It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the lndustrial 
Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the 
forum depends upon a refe

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