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RAJARAM versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS

Citation: [2022] 16 S.C.R. 99 · Decided: 16-12-2022 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. RAVINDRA BHAT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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RAJARAM
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2311 of 2022)
DECEMBER 16, 2022
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.]
Evidence Act, 1872 โ€“ s. 32 โ€“ Inconsistencies between Multiple
dying declaration โ€“ Prosecution case that victim-deceased was
brought to hospital by her husband (appellant) in burnt condition
โ€“ Her first dying declaration (Ex. P-11) was recorded in which
appellant was not named โ€“ Her second dying declaration (Ex.
P-26) was recorded by the police before she succumbed to the injuries
in which she named her husband โ€“ The trial Court convicted one
accused u/s.302 IPC and the appellant & other accused for the
offences u/s 498A of IPC โ€“ Appellant and other accused challenged
their conviction and sentence, however, the High Court rejected
their appeals โ€“ High Court in its judgment accepted the first dying
declaration and rejected the second dying declaration recorded by
the police โ€“ On appeal, held: The weight and utility of a dying
declaration depend upon the surrounding circumstances and the
credibility which the court attaches to it, having regard to the
evidence led before it โ€“ Therefore, whether it is essential to have
medical certification before the statement is recorded, who records
it, etc. are all fact dependent, and no stereotypical approach can
be adopted by courts โ€“ In case of the second dying declaration, the
High Court was of the opinion that even though PW-15 was not
required to obtain fitness certificate from the doctor, yet in view of
the last line in the dying statement that her condition was bad, it
was unsafe to rely on such statement โ€“ The second dying declaration
is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of
the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other
accused โ€“ The only evidence against the appellant, i.e., second
dying declaration was discredited by the High Court, there is no
other material to sustain his conviction โ€“ The recoveries of article
and the other circumstances do not further the prosecutionโ€™s case
u/s. 498A as against the appellant โ€“ Appellantโ€™s conviction and
sentence set aside โ€“ Penal Code, 1860 โ€“ ss.302, 307, 304-B,498-A.
[2022] 16 S.C.R. 99
99
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 16 S.C.R.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The principles enunciated by the decision of this
court, especially Laxman and the decisions dealing with multiple
dying declarations, adduced in the course of a criminal trial,
especially where the deceased had been a victim of burns and
had succumbed to burn injuries and had prior to death made more
than one dying declaration have indicated that test of credibility
having regard to the overall facts on record, has to be adopted.
This court notices that the present is a case where the second
dying declaration has been rejected completely by the High Court.
In these circumstances, the cumulative weight of evidence relied
upon by the High Court needs to be examined to ascertain
whether the appellant is guilty of the offence he stands convicted
for, i.e., Section 498A IPC. Ex. P-26, the second dying declaration
is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of
the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other
accused. Both the courts below have noticed that in Ex. P-11, the
first dying declaration, the appellant has not been named; rather
he along with his father took the deceased in a critically injured
state to the hospital. Undoubtedly, the focus of the first dying
declaration is only upon the incident involving pouring of kerosene
and setting the deceased on fire. The second dying declaration,
Ex. P-26 alone elaborates acts of cruelty. That is the only piece of
incriminating evidence against the accused. As far as the recovery
of articles and the smell of kerosene in the report considered by
the court are concerned, they are circumstances relating to the
incident of setting the deceased on fire. They do not further the
prosecutionโ€™s case under Section 498A as against the appellant.
Having regard to the above circumstances, especially the fact
that the only evidence against the appellant, i.e., Ex. P-26 was
discredited by the High Court, there is no other material to sustain
his conviction. [Paras 19-21][111-D-H; 112-A-B]
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra [2002] Suppl. SCR
697 โ€“ followed.
Jagbir Singh v. State of NCT Delhi (2019) 8 SCC 779 :
[2019] 11 SCR 1137; Lakhan v. State of Madhya
Pradesh [2010] 9 SCR 705 โ€“ relied on.
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