RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH versus THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1952] 1 S.C.R. 1056 · Decided: 05-05-1952 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. PATANJALI SASTRI · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

1952 
May 2, 5. 
1056 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1952] 
RAJA SURIYA PAL SINGH 
v. 
THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER 
(AND OTHER CASES) 
[PATANJALI SASTR! C.J., MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, 
MuKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] 
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 
(I of 1951 )-Law for abolition of zamindaries and intermediate 
tenures-Validity-Provision for compensation and public purpose 
-Necessity of-Right of eminent domain-Jurisdictfrm of Court 
to enquire into validity of Act-Constitution of India, 
1950--
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, Arts. 31, 31-A, 31-B, 
362; Sch. VII, List II, entries 18, 36, List l/l, entry 42-De/ega-
tion of legislative powers-Fraud on the Constitution-Spirit of the 
Constitution-Meanings of "public purpose
11
, "law", "legislature" -
Compulsory acquisitiq_n of Crown grants, charities and private 
pro~ 
perty of Rulers under covena~t of merger-Legality. 
Held by the ·Full Court (PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., MAHAJAN, 
MuKHERJEA, 
DAs 
and 
CHANDRASEKHARA 
AtYAR 
JJ.).-The 
Uuar Pradesh 
Za1nindari Abolition 
and 
Land 
Reforms 
Act, 
1950, 
is 
valid in its entir.ety. The jurisdiction of the court to 
question its validity on the ground that it does not provide for 
payment of compensation is barred by arts. 31(4), 31-A and 31-B 
of the Constitution. The said Act is not a fraud on the Constitu-
tion ; 
it does not delegate 
essential 
legislative 
power 
to 
the 
executive ; and is not liable to be impugned on the ground of 
absence of a public purpose. 
Per 
MAHAJAN J.-(i) The expression 
"public purpose" is 
not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. 
It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion. 
The definition of the expression is elastic and takes its 
colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying 
with the time and the state of society and its needs. 
The point 
to be determined in each case is whether it is in the interest of 
the community as distinguished from the private interest of an 
individual. 
(ii) There, _is nothing in law to prevent the subject-matter 
of a Crown grant being compulsorily acquired for a public pur~ 
pose and land held by the taluqdars of Oudh does not therefore 
stand on a higher footing than that of other owners of Oudh. 
(iii) Property dedicated to charity by a private individuals is 
not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire 
property for a public purpose. 
• 
• 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
1057· 
(iv) Recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution 
when its provisions are explicit ; and when the fundamental law 
has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the 
general powers conferred on the legislature it is not proper to 
~ deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in 
the spirit of the Constitution. 
(v) The provisions of art. 31(2) do not stand repealed by 
art. 31-A. 
On the other hand the proviso to art. 31-A keeps them 
-> 
alive. 
The only difference is that with regard to estates the 
'-' President 
has 
been 
constituted 
the 
sole 
judge for 
deciding 
whether a State law has complied with art. 31(2). 
(vi) When a whole estate is being acquired and payment of 
_... 
compensation is based on the net income of the whole estate, it 
cannot be said that the legislation is of a confiscatory character 
merely because there are non-income fetching properties also in 
the estate. 
DAs J.-(i) The 
existeince 
of 
a 
public 
purpose 
and 
the 
necessity for payment of compensation cannot be said to be an 
inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of Government. 
;, The Indian Constitution has in art. 31 (2) recognised these two 
c 
elements as a pre-requisite to the exercise of the po~rer of eminent 
domain, and as the impugned Act has been expressly 
taken 
out 
J 
of the operation of those provisions, 
the 
question 
of 
invoking 
any 
imaginary spirit of the Constitution cannot be entertained. 
· 
The invocation of such an imaginary spirit will run counter to 
the express letter of arts. 31( 4), 31-A and 31-B. 
(ii) 
The claim 
~ 
of the Rulers with regard to their private properties is not within 
• 
art. 362; by offering compensation their ownership is recognised; 
in any event, art. 362 imposes no legal obligation on the Parlia-
ment or State Legislature, and art. 
363 
bars 
the 
jurisdiction 
of the court with respect to disputes 'arising out of covenants 
of merger. 
• 
-t 
CIVIL 

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