LexRAJA RAMESHWAR RAO AND ANOTHER versus RAJA GOVIND RAO
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Jl.-Iarch a8, 618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] RAJA RAMESHWAR RAO AND ANOTHER v. RAJA GOVIND RAO (P. B. GAJE~DRAGADKAR and K. N. WANOHOO, JJ.) J agir-Grant made by Nizam-Adverse possession-Claim of limited right as permanent lessee-M aintainability-J ndian Limita- tio11 Act, r908 (9 of r908), art. r44. Although title to a limited interest in property can be acquired by adverse possession, no limited interest in the nature of a permanent lease can be ordinarily acquired in a jagir which must initially be presumed to enure for the life-time of the grantee unless the grant itself shows otherwise. Sankaran v. Periasami, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 467, Thakore Fatehsingji Dipsangji v. Bamanji Ardeshir Dalal, (1903) l.L.R. 27 Born. 515, Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Peria- yanan Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261 an<l Gulabdas.J14gjivandas v. The Collector of S14rat, (1878) L.R. 6 I.A 54, referred to. Although in the former State of Hyderabad a son might. in .1ormal course be allowed to succeed to the father's jagir, it could not be said that jagirs granted by the State were therefore permanent and hereditary in character, for the State generally had the right to resume the grant. Raje Vinaykrao Nemiwant Brahmin, v. Raje Shriniwasrao Nemiwant Brahmin, l.L.R. [1942] Nag. 526 and Ahmad-un-Nissa Begum v. State, A.LR. 1952 Hyd. 163, referred to. Where, therefore, a grant was continued in a family from generation to generation, each grantee must be taken to hold it for his life and limitation against each must start from the date of his title. Since a jagirdar could not grant a lease beyond his lifetime unless specifically empowered by the sanad or the law of the State, the period of adverse possession against one jagirdar could not be tacked to that against another for the purpose of art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. ln this respect a jagirdar stood on a different footing from that of the manager of a temple. ]agdish Narayan v. Nawab Saeed Ahmed Khan,.A.l.R. 1946 P.C. 59, referred to. Shrimat Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Periyannan Chetti, (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 261, distinguished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 399 of 1957. Appeal from .the judgment and decree dated July 27, 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Hydera- bad in Civil Appeals Nos. 1 and 2 of 1954-55. ) t 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 619 S. T. Desai, C. Krishna Reddi, T. Ramachandra Rao and M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants. Raja Rameshwat Sadashiv Rao, J.B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley, Rao & Another for the respondent. v. Raja Govind Ran 1961. March 28. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the former High Court of Hyderabad. A suit was brought by the respondent in 1920 with res- pect to village Timmapet. The case of the respondent was that the village had been granted to his ancestor Harinarayan alias Ifaja Nemiwant Bahadur by the Nizam in 1787. On the death of Raja Harinarayan, the village was conferred by another sanad on his son Raja Govind Narayan in 1811. Ever since then the village had continued in the possession of the descen- dants of Raja Govind Narayan. In 1817, Raja Govind Narayan granted this village on Tahud (i.e., lease) to Raja Rama Krishna Rao, ancestor of the defendants. Inam inquiries with respect to this village started in 190 l and then an objection was made on behalf of the appellants that the village had been granted to their ancestors by tho Nizam and the respondent was only entitled to the pan mukta of the village and no more.· Pan mukta means a fixed sum which is payable in perpetuity for any land granted by the Ruler or the jagirdar to any person. The respondent's case further was that the lease money was being regularly paid, though some time before the suit there was some default. The respondent had to file a suit to recover the lease money which was decreed and the decretal amount was recovered. In 1917 disputes arose between the parties and consequently in 1918 the respondent asked the appellants to vacate the village. They, however, refused to do so. There- upon the present suit was filed in 1920 and the respondent's case was that the lease granted to the appellants was not a permanent lease and could only enure for the lifetime of the grantor and there- fore the respondent was entitled to possession of the ~Vanchoo ]. 620 SUPREME COUR
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