LexRAJA JAGANNATH BAKSH SINGH versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J63]
RAJA JAGANNATH BAKSH SINGH
v .
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. c.
DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Land Holding -Notice of Aase8sment -D•letmination .of
annual mlue-'-Constitutional validity of enactment-U. P. Larg•
Land Holdings Tax Act, J9{J7 (U. P. 31 of 1957), 88. 7 (2),
5 (1)-Conatitution of India, Arts. U, 19 (1) (b), 31, Sch. VII,
List II, Entry 49.
This petition challenged the constitutional validity of a
notice of assessment served under s.7 (2) of the U. P. Large
Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957. The High Court had found
against the petitioner. His case was that the relevant provisions
of the Act were unconstitutional as the State Legislature was
incompetent to pass the Act, that the Act violated Arts. 14, 19
and 31 of the comtitution and that the rates fixed by the State
Government under s. 5(1) of the Act were invalid as being
contrary to that section. The impugned Act has since been
repealed by the U. P. Imposition of ceiling of Land Holdings
Act, 1961, with effect from the 30th June, 1961.
Held, that the contentions \Vere without substance and
the petition must fail.
The cardinal rule of interpreting the words used by, the
Constitution in conferring legislative power Wds that they
01ust receive the most liberal construction and if they are
words of wide amplitude the construction must accord with
it.
If a general word was used it must be so construed as to
extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters that can be
reasonably included in it. So construed, there could be no
doubt that the word •!and' in Entry 49, List II, 7th Schedule
includes all lands, whether agricultural or non-agricultural.
Since the impugned Act imposed tax on land holdings, it
was within the competance of the State Legislature and its
validity was beyond challenge.
Navinchandra Mafatlal, Bombay v.. Commissioner of
Income-tax, (1955] I. S.C.R. 829, and United Province• v. Jll.
Atiqa Begum, (1940] F. C.R. 110, referred to.
The word 'may' in s.5(1) of the Act could not in the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPJRTS
221
context mean 'shall' or •must'. While prescribing the maxi-
mum limit of the multiple which could not be exceeded, that
section rightly left it to the discretion of the State Government
to adjust it suitably to local requirement and the quality of
the land involved. The notification bsucd the Siate Govern-
ment under s. 5(1) must, therefore, be held to have complied
with the statutory requirements prescribed therefor.
It is now settled Jaw that a taxing statute can be challe-
nged on the ground that it infringes a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Mohammad Yasin v. Town Area Committee, J alabad, [ 1952]
S. C. R. 578, State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.
[1953] S. C.R. 1069, The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v.
State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S C. R. 603, Oh. Tikn Ram.ii v. State
of U. P. [1956] S. C.R. ~93 and Balaji v. Income Ta.r; Officer,
[1962] 2 S. C. R. 983, relied on.
.
Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, [1951] S. C.R. 127 and
L. H. Jamkhani v; Union of India, [1955] l S. C. R. 769,
considered M. Oullock v. ltfnryland, [1819] 4 L. ed. 579,
referred to.
Therefore, a taxing statute can be challenged under
Art. 14 if it purports to impose on the same class of property,
similarly situated an incidence of taxation which leads to
obvious inequality.
The legislature can freely choose its objects of taxation,
fix the rate and classify persons and properties for that pur-
pose, and the classification, if rational, cannot be challenged
merely because the rates are different for different classes or
objects. But if the taxing status contravenes Art. 14 of the
Constitution in its operation, the Courts are free to interfere.
Similarly if it 'provides no machinery or procedure for the
recovery or
assessment of the tax, so that the imposition
partakes of the character of a purely administrative affair,
the statute can, in a proper
case, be challenged under
Art. 19 (I) ( f).
A taxing statute that affects no fundamental rights meets
the requirement of Art. 31 (1).
Article 31 (2) can have no
application to such a statute even though the tax may be
excessive and may ultimately lead to the loss of the assessee's
property. This is evident from the provisions of Art. 31 (2A)
and 31 (5) (b) (i).
Section 5 ( l) of the impugned Act did nExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.