RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS versus THE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMIS SIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS.

Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 988 · Decided: 28-10-1955 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

1955 
Octobtr 28 
988 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1955] 
RAJA BAHADUR KAMAKSHYA NARAIN 
SINGH AND OTHERS 
v. 
THE COLLECTOR AND DEPUTY COMMIS-
SIONER OF HAZARIBAGH AND OTHERS. 
[S. R. DAs, ACTING C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-
DAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.] 
Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihor Act XXX of 1950), ss. 
3(1), 4(a), 4(h), 5, 7-Buildings standing on the land comprised in 
the estate-Transfer after 
the first day of January, 1946-Estate 
notified as having become vested in the State-Notice to the transferee 
under s. 4(h)-Notification purporting to vest in the State the trans-
ferred properties-Validity-S. 4(h ), whether ultra vires. 
On the 29th of December, 1947, petitioner No. I executed a 
lease to C (a company) of certain properties 
consisting of land• 
and buildings comprised in the 
estate 
belonging to him. 
Subse-
quently, in 1949 he executed a deed of settlement whereby he trans-
ferred the properties 
to 
three trustees, 
namely, 
himself and peti-
tioners 2 and 3. Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX 
of 1950) came into force on the 25th of September, 1950, and on 
the 3rd of 
November, 1951, the State of Bihar issued a notifica-
tion under s. 3( I) of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner 
No. I had passed to and become vested in the State. A notice under 
s. 4(h) of the Act was issued by the Collector to C and on the 4th 
of March, 1954, the State GoYCrrunent issued 
a notification under 
s. 3(1) purporting to vest in the State the properties in question. It 
was contended for the petitioners that the buildings standing on the 
land comprised in the notified estate did not vest in the State, on 
the ground (I) that the estate of the petitioner No. I did not vest in 
the State under s. 3 of the Act but by virtue of the provisions of s. 
4, (2) that the definition of "estate" in the Act speaks of land only 
and not of any building on it, (3) that on the date of vesting, the 
buildings were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent 
of the notified estate within the meaning of>. 4(a), and (4) thats. 
4(h) is ultra vires the 
Constitution as it iiuposes an unreasonable 
restriction on the 
fundamental right 
of the 
petitioners to realise 
rent from the company. 
Held, that (1) ,vhether the estate of petitioner No. 1 vested in 
the 
State by reason of the publication of the 
notification under 
s. 3 or by virtue of the provisions of s. 4 was of little consequence 
as in either case a vesting took place ; 
(2) although in the definition of "estate" the word land is uoed 
and there is no mention of the word building, the provisions of ss: 
.._, 5 and 7 sho'v the intention of the 
legislature to include some-
2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
989 
thing more than merely the land of a notified estate as vesting in 
the 
State. 
Under s. 4(a), buildings of a certain description 
and 
other things vest in the State absolutely on the publication of a no-
tification under s. 3. Under ss. 5 and 7, the buildings mentioned 
therein are deemed to be settled by the· State with the intermediary 
and this could only be on the supposition that the buildings vested 
in the State, the intermediary being a settlee under the State ; 
(3) ss. 4(a) and 4(h) must be read together. Under. s. 4(h), the 
use to which the building was put previous to its transfer after the 
first day of January, 1946, and not thereafter was what the Collector 
was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its 
transfer after the. first day of January, 1946. If a transfer was made 
after the first day of January, 1946 of a building comprised in the 
notified estate which was used immediately previous to the date of 
transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of 
such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under s. 4(h) 
and the building would vest absolutely in the State on the publica-
tion of the notification and the provisions of s. 4(a) must be read 
accordingly ; and 
( 4) the Collector's powers under s. 4(h), wide as they are, are 
not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested. S. 4(h) is a part of 
a validly enacted law of acquisition of estates and is an integral 
part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place. 
The Act or s. 4(h) of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the 
fundamental right of the petitioners, therefore, does not arise. The 
Act including s. 4(h) of it, is protected by Art. 31-A of the Cons

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