LexRAGHUNATH RAI BAREJA AND ANR. versus PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS.
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RAGHUNA TH RAI BAREJA AND ANR. A v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS. DECEMBER 6, 2006 (S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] B . Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993- ss. 17, 18, 24, 31 and 34-Execution petition pending before High Court- Transfer to Debts Recovery Tribunal-Exercising its jurisdiction under inherent C powers-Property of-Held: Transfer of execution petition to Debts Recovery Tribunai was illegal, without jurisdiction and beyond the scope of Section 31 of the Act-There are no such inherent powers of the Court apart from Section 31 for transferring the execution proceedings to the Tribunal-Court cannot transfer the proceeding even under Section 446 of Companies Act as the same is not applicable once 1993 Act came into force as in view of D Section 34, 1993 Act has overriding effect-Also 1993 Act being special statute overrides the general statute i.e. Companies Act-Moreover Section 446 (3) has been omitted by Amendment Act-Companies Act, 1956-Section 446--Companies (Court) Rules 1959. Section 24-Execution petition-pending before company court- E Transfer of the petition to Debts Recovery Tribunal-After I 2 years-Held: Recovery in question is time barred-Limitation Act, 1963-Artic/e 136. Interpretation. of Statutes-Applicability of interpretation-When permissable-Held: Where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous. recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the F literal rule-Departure from literal rule should only be done in very rare cases-Court should not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation- There should be judicial restraint in this regard Legislative intent-Use of in interpretation of statute-Held: It can be G resorted to when the language is doubtful or ambiguous-When the language is clear, the legislative intention should be gathered from the language used Equity and Law-Equity vis-a-vis Law-Prevailing effect of-Held: In case of conflict between equity and law, law will prevail-Equity can only 287 II 288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 10 S.C.R. A supplement the law, but cannot supplant or override it. Maxim-Maxim dura lex sed lex-Meaning of Respondent-Bank filed a Company petition for recovery against the company which had taken loan from the Bank. The Company was already B wound up. Appellant is the guarantor of the loan and Director of the Company. Decree was passed in favour of the Bank on 15.1.1987. Bank filed three execution petitions. First in 1990 which was dismissed; second in 1994 and the same was also dismissed. In 1999 Bank filed third execution petition without impleading the appellant as party to the same. Petition was dismissed. The order in third execution petition was recalled after the bank had filed C application for restoration of the third execution petition with fresh Memo of Parties. In 1998 Bank filed petition under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Rule 117 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 seeking leave of D the Court to commence the Execution proceedigs before the Tribunal which had come into existance in 1993 by virtue of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Ad, 1993 (RDB Act). The petition was allowed by the Company Court. In 2005, Bank filed application under Section 9 of Companies (Court) Rules read with Sections 17 and 18 of RDB Act for transfer of the Execution petition to the Tribunal. High Court transferred the E execution petition to the Tribunal under its inherent powers. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The order of the High Court transferring the Execution F Petition pending before it to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, was clearly beyond the scope of Section 31 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 because Section 31 states that only suits or other proceeding pending before the Court immediately before the establishment of the Tribunal under the Act, stand transferred to the Tribunal. Since admittedly G the Tribunal in the present case, had been established in 1993, and no proceeding was pending before it on the date when it was established, no transfer could take place under Section 31ofthe RDB Act. At any event the third Execution Petition which was transferred by the impugned order was filed by the respondent-Bank on 11.1.1999, i.e. much after the Tribunal had been established. Hence obviously there could be n
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