RAGHUNANDAN versus STATE OF U.P.
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92 RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF U.P. January JO, 1974 (M. H. BEG AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.] Murder-Criminal Procedure Code-Ss.162, 428 and 540-Duty of co.urt to put ,e5Sential questions-Evidence Act, s. 165-SCfJpe of. All the appellants were tried for various offences under the Penal Code. The first appellant (Cr. A. 10 of 1973) was held guilty of th.e offence of murder of the de- ceased by shooting him with a gun while the other appellants Vi'Cre held guilty or -0ffences under Ss. 147 and 148, I. P. C. All the appellants were held guilty of offences punishable under Ss. 307 and 323 read withs. 149. The first appellant was sentenced to death while the others to imprisonment for life. The High Court confirmed the sentences. Allowing the appeals in part and remitting the cases to the High Court for dis- posal, HELD : Several material points escaped consideration by the High Court. In a case of death sentence one would have expected a closer and a more critical scrutiny and a fuller discussion by the High Court of the evidence in the case and of the material questions arising for decision before it together with its decisions suppor· ted by more than what could appear as perfunctory reasoning. [99E;lOOB] (1) The more important questions emerging from a reading of the poSt~ 1nortem report regarding the contents of the stomach of the deceased, .-considered in the context of the alleged time of the murder have not ·been discussed at aU by the High Court. It is precisely questions of this kind which, even if the prosecution or the defence counsel omitted to .put, the trial court could and should have put to the doctor who conducted the post mortem to clear up the position. If the trial Court had failed to consider ·their importance, the High Court itself could and should have taken furher expert medical evidence under Ss. 540 and 428, Cr. P. C. on this question. [9F] (2) It is true that the ban imposed bys. 162, Cr. P. C. against the use of a state· ment of a witness recorded by the police during investigation, appears sweeping and wide. But at the same time, the powers of the court under s. 165 of the Evidence Act to put any questions to a witness are also couched in very wide terms authoris. ing the judge "in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts" to "ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant". The first proviso to s. 165, Evidence Act, enacting that, despite the powers of the court to put any question to a witness, the judgment must be based upon facts declared by the Act to be relevant, only serves to emphasise the width of the power of the court to question a witness. The second proviso in this section preserves the privileges of witnesses to rerulic to answer certain questions and prohibits only questions which would be considered i1nproper under Ss. 148 and 149, Evidence Act. Statements of witnesses made to the pOlice during the investigation do not fall under any prohibited category mentioned ins. 165, Evidence Act. Ifs. 162 Cr. P. C. was meant to be so wide in its sweep it could make a further in,road upon the powers of the judge to put questions under s. J65, £\.'!dencc Act. If that was the correct position atJcasts. 162, Cr. P. C. would l.1ave said so explicitly. Section 165, Evidence Act was .already on the stu!ute book whens. 162, Cr. P. C. 'vas enacted. A B c D E F G It is certainly quite arguable thats. 162. Cr. P. C. docs an1ount to a prohibition 11 ~gainst the use even by the court of statements mentioned there. Nevertheless, the purpose of the prohibition of s. 162, Cr. P. C. being to prevent unfair use by the prosecution of statements made by witnesses to the police during the course of in· ··vestigation, \Vhile the proviso is intended for the benefit of the defence, it could be ) RAGHUNANDAN 1'. U. P. S'J'.ATE (Beg, J.) 93 A urged that, in order to secure the ends of justice, the pr"hibition, by taking into account. its purpase and the mischief it was designed to prevent as well as its context, must be confined in its scope to the use by parties only to a proceeding of statements men- tioned therein, B c D E F G H The language of s. 162, Cr. P. C., though wide, is not explicit or specific enough to extend the prohibition to the use of the wide and special powers of the court to question a witness, expressly and explicitly g
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