RAGHUBAR DAYAL JAI PRAKASH versus THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
RAGHUBAR DAYAL JAI PRAKASH
1'.
THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANOHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
547
Forward Contracts-Law to regulate such contracta-Ruog-
nition of G!&Ociations-Constitutional validity of enactm~nt
Forward Contract• (Regulation) Act, 1952 (74 of 1952), sa.2(j),
5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 2I(e) & (f)-Con,,titution of India, Arl1
14, 19(1)(!), 19(1)(g), 19(5), 19(6).
Tradt"rs like the petitioner combined to,gether to form an
association the objects of \Vhich were to regulate forward
transactions in the sale and purchase of gur and other commo--
~ dities entered into between the n1embers -of the association, as
also to declare the rates at which the contracts vvere to be
settled on the dates fixed for delivery.
The petitioner had
entered into forward contracts of purchase . of gur at certain
rates and had also deposited as the buyer the amount as well a1
the special margin required to be deposited under the bye-laws
of the association. Contracts entered into by him were outstand·
ing on February 11, 1959, when on that date the Central
Government isliued a notification under s.15 of the Forward
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, under which every forward
contract for the sale of purchase of any goods specified in the
~ notification which vvas entered into in the area specified therein
otherwi5c than betv\.'een members of a recognised association
or through or with any such member, shall be illegal. The
association in question of which the petitioner was a me111ber,
was not on the date of the notification dated February 11, 1959
recoKnised by the Central Governn1ent under s. 6 of the ~A.ct, as
a result of which the forwar.::1 contracts entered into by him
'
became illrgal and void.
The further consequence of the
.).- notification was that under s. 16 the transactions entered into
by the petitionrr and others situated similarly like him which
remained to be performed after the said date were to be
deemed to be clo~ed out on that date and the differences arising
out of the contract \\'ere to be payable not at the rate originally
stipulated by the contracting parties but at the rates specified
in the notification. The petitioner challenged the validity of
the provi•ions of the Act on the grounds inter alia (I) that
ss. 5 and 6 relating to the recognition of associations by the
)
Central Government and s. l 0 which enabled it to direct rules
to be made and, in case the recognised
as~ociation failed to
\;\ke li\Ction, to them•clve• make the rules, infringed the frecdolll
1961
Stptembar 12.
1961
Ra~huhar Daynl
Jai Prakash
v.
Thi l:'niori of India
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, f'
(2) thats. 15 infringed Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 19(l)(g), and
(3) that s.16 in so far as it enabled the Government to fix the
ratr:; at which thr. differences payable by or.e party to the other,
without giving any indication of the principles underlying the
fixation of the price, conferred an unguided power and offended
Art. 14.
Held:
(I) that ss. 5, 6 and 10 and other provisions in
Ch. III of the Forwards Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1%2,
proceeded on the basis that or_ganisations of tradesmen might
be ~ntrusted with the task of regulating these tran'.liactions, so
that while legitimate trade might be furthered the evil conse-
quence< of undesirable speculation might be a\·oided, and they
were enacted with the object of ensuring effective control over
the mechanism of forward trading. 1\ccordingly, thi: provisions
in Ch. III of the Act do not contravene Art. 19(1)'.r) of the
Constitution.
(2) that on a proper comtruction of s.15 the recognition
of an association under the provisions of the Act \vas not an
e!~ential pre.requisite before a notification could be issued under
the section, and that the issue of such a notification \\·as not
an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to
carry on business within the meaning of Art. I 9(G) of the
Con~tinttion of In<lia.
(3) that the selection of the commodity for the regula-
tion of forward trading in it or of prohibition of <uch trading
could only be left to the Government and the purposes for
\\·hich the pow("r 'vas to be used and the machinery created for
the investigation furnished sufficient guidance; consequently,
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