LexRAGHUBAR DAYAL (DEAD) versus STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
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r RAGHUBAR DAYAL (DEAD) A v. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. MAY 2, 1995 [K. RAMASWAMY AND B.L. HANSARIA, JJ.] B Govemmellt Grants Act, 1895 : Section 3-Land-<irand for cultivation-Computation of ceiling area-Grant held in substance of lease for agriculture-Grantee held holder C and not outside the purview of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 : Section 3(9T-'Holding'-Meaning of-Grantee of Government land for cultivation held holder. D Sections 6(h) and !)-Exemption clause-Deletion of-Amendment coming into force before detennination of ceiling of land-Held no fresh notice was necessary under Section 9. U.P. Zamindari Abolition of Land Refonns Act, 1950: Section 133-A E Applicability of The appellant was granted certain parcels or land on July 11, 1956 under the Government Grants Act, 1895 for cultivation. Under the terms or the grant the grantee was to pay annual lease amount and was to personally cultivate the land within the prescribed period; the land was to be used for F cultivation only and purposes incidental there!<>"; the grantee was not to part with his possession. Later by a notice dated 20th October 1974 issued under Section 10(2) orthe U.P. Imposition or Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960 the prescribed authority determined the surplus land calling upon the appellant to surrender the excess land. /The appellant filed appeals before G the appellant authority and the Civil Judge which were dismissed. The High Court also confirmed the orders or the authorities under the Act. In appeals to this Court it was contended for the appellants that (i) the computation or surplus land was illegal because the land covered under the Grants Act was to be excluded from the operation or the 1960 Act; (ii) H 1093 1094 SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1995) 3 S.C.R. A notice determining surplus land was without jurisdiction as no fresh notice' , was issued to the appellant under section 9 of 1960 Act after the deletion of , the exemption clause 6(h) by Amendment Act on January 14, 1975; and (iii) 'f • the Government Grant is not a lease and therefore section 3(9) of 1960 Act was inapplicable. B Dismissing the appeals, this Court HELD : 1. The preamble to the grant clearly mentioned that the land was granted for cultivation to make the improved methods of cultivation within the meaning of section 3(8) of the U.P. Tenancy Act XVII of 1939. C Thus it could be seen.that though it is a grant made under the Government Grants Act, it is in substance a lease of agricultural land granted by the Government to the appellant for cultivation subject to the covenants con- tained thereunder. During the period of the subsistance of the lease it is terminable on notice by either side. Accordingly, the appellant is a bolder of agricultural lands within the meaning of section 3(9) of the 1960 Act. D (1096-G, 1097-D, FJ 2. Even otherwise the Government Grants Act itself prescribed the applicability of the Act to the lands covered by the grant. The proviso to sub-section (3) of section 3 was inserted with retrospective effect. By opera- E tion of the said proviso the Act clearly applied for the purpose of computa- tion of the ceiling area of the agricultural lands. Thus it would appear that the Government Grants Act intended that even the grantee under that Act shall not be in excess of the ceiling area prescribed under the Act. Thereby, the lessee of the Government land, though had a grant under the Govern- ment Grants Act, cannot claim to have been outside the purview of the Act. F Therefore, the view taken by the authorities below and the High Court is ~ • perfectly right and legal. (1097-G-H, 1098-B-C] 3. Section 6(h) of the 1960 Act was deleted by way of an Amendment made in January 1975 but it was made effective from 1973. Notice under section 10(2) was issued to the appellant by the Prescribed Authority on G October 20, 1974 and, as such, after the Amendment Act had become effective. By the date of the determination of the ceiling land, the amend- ment had come into force. Therefore, the exemption granted under section 6(h) stood deleted. In consequence, the acts done by the authorities in determining the ceiling area and declaration of surplus land was within H their power and jurisdiction. [1098-H, 1099-A-B] •· )' RAGHUBAR DAYAL v. STATE 1095 4. Since the lease itself was granted by the Government under t
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