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RAGHAVENDRA SWAMY MUTT versus UTTARADI MUTT

Citation: [2016] 3 S.C.R. 11 · Decided: 30-03-2016 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: DIPAK MISRA

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2016] 3 S.C.R. 11 
RAGHAVENDRA SWAMY MUTT 
v. 
UTTARADI MUTT 
(Civil Appeal No.3190of2016) 
MARCH 30, 2016 
(DIPAK MISRA AND SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - ss. 100, 96; Or. XL!, r 5(3), 
Or. XLJ!, r 1, 2 - Second appeal - Formulation of substantial 
question of law - On facts, the High Court not admitting second 
appeal as no substantial question of law formulated and vacated 
the interi111 order passed in IA - Whether the High Court could 
entertain IA seeking interim relief - Held: High Court cannot ad111it 
a second appeal without examining whether it raises any substantial 
question of law for admission and thereafte1; it is obliged to for111ulate 
the substantial question of law - Solely because the Court has the 
iurisdiction to pass an ex parte order, it does not e111power it not to 
formulate the substantial question of law for the purpose of 
admission, defer the date of admission and pass an order of stay or 
grant an interim relief - It is not the sche111e of CPC after its 
amendment in 1976 - Thus, the High Court rectified its mistake by 
vacating the order passed in IA and was the correct approach 
adopted by the High Court. 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 In the instant ease, the High Court has not yet 
admitted the matter. It is not in dispute that no substantial question 
of law has been formulated as it could not have been when the 
appeal has not been admitted. As appeal under Section 100 CPC 
is required to be admitted only on substantial question/questions 
of law. It cannot be formal admission like an appeal under Section 
96 CPC. That is the fundamental imperative. It is peremptory in 
character, and that makes the principle absolutely cardinal. [Para 
18) [19-D) 
1.2 For passing an ex parte order, the Court has to keep in 
mind the postulates provided under sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of Order 
XLI. The Court is obligated to keep in view the language 
employed under Section 100 CPC. It is because formulation of 
substantial question of law enables the High Court to entertain 
11 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
12 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS. 
[2016] 3 S.C.R. 
A 
an appeal and thereafter proeeed to pass an order. The Court 
has the jurisdiction to pass an interim order subject to the language 
employed in Order XLI. Rule si3). It is clear that the High Court 
cannot admit a second appeal without examining whether it raises 
any substa'ntial question of law· for admission and thereafter, it is 
B 
obliged to .formulate the substantial question oflaw. Solely because 
. . the Court has the jurisdiction to pass an ex parte order, it does 
... .µot .empower it 11ot.to formulate the substantial question of law 
~' : for tli~ ptjrp_ti~e· of· a~mission, defe'r the date of admission and 
.... pass 1,m 9rd~~ .. ()(~t~y :or.grn11Umi.11,terim relief. That is not the 
,'.".sch~irie. 6f CP.Caff~r 'its aiherl'd.i:Ileritin 1976 and that is not the 
C 
·tenor of precedents of this Court'and it has been clearly so stated 
in Ram Plia/ case •. Therefore, the High Court has rectified its 
. mistake by vacating the ·order passed in IA and it is the correct 
approach adopted by the High Court. Thus, the impugned order 
is absolutely impregnable. [Para 23) [21-G-H; 22-A-C] 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
1.3 The iiigh Court is requested to take up the second appeal 
for admission and, if it finds that there is a substantial question of 
law involved, proceed accordingly and ·deal with IA as required 
in law. The interim order passed by this Court on earlier occasion 
should not be construed as an expression of any opinion from 
any count. It was a pure and simple ml interim arrangement. [Para 
24) [22-D-E) 
A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan & Others 
AIR 2000 SC 3032 : 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 303; Ram 
Phal v. Banarasi & Ors. (2003) 11 SCC 762; !shwar 
Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 24 : (2000) 
1 SCC 434; Roop Sinf;{h v. Ram Sinf;{h 2000 (2) SCR 
605 : (2000) 3 SCC 708; Municipal Committee, 
Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEE & Others 2010 (13) SCR 
658 : (2010) 13 SCC 216; Umerkhan v. Bismillabi alias 
Babula! Shaikh and Others 2011 (9) SCR 551 : (2011) 
9 sec 684 - referred to. 
Case Law Reference 
2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 303 
(2003) 11 sec 762 
1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 24 
20QQ (2) SCR 605 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
referred to 
Para 6 
Para 11 
Para 14 
Para 15 
- . . : ' 
RAGHAVENDRA SWAMY MUTT v .. UTTARADI MUTT 
13 
2010 (13) SCR 658 
21)11 (9) SCR 551 
" 
. 
rt'ferred to 
referred ~o 
Para 16 

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