RADHEY SHYAM AGGARWAL versus STATE N.C.T. DELHI

Citation: [2009] 1 S.C.R. 965 · Decided: 06-02-2009 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Disposed off
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Judgment (excerpt)

[2009] 1 S.C.R. 965 
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RADHEY SHY AM AGGARWAL 
A 
v. 
STATE N.C.T. DELHI 
(Criminal Appeal No.423 of 2002) 
FEBRUARY 6, 2009 
B 
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR 
GANGUL Y, JJ.] 
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT, 1954: c 
S. 16-A - Provision for summary trial -
Trial Court 
adopting warrant case procedure - Correctness of - Held: 
Plea raised for the first time in SLP - No prejudice shown -
Hence no violation of requirements of s. 16A - However, as 
t 
the occurrence took place nearly two years back and D 
infractions related to a small quantity, sentence reduced to 
the period already undergone - Constitution of India, 1950 
~ Article 136 - New plea. 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal 
Appeal No.423 of 2002. 
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From the final Order dated 22.2.2001 of the High Court 
of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. Revision No. 77/2001. 
S.K. Divakar and S.R. Seita for the Appellant. 
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S. Wasim A. Qadri, Sudha Pal and Anil Katiyar for the 
Respondent. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.1. The only point urged in this 
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appeal is that the High Court ought to have held that the 
provisions of Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food 
Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short the 'Act') providing for 
summary trial are mandatory. While In the instant case the trial 
965 
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966 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2009) 1 S.C.R. 
A Court adopted the warrant case procedure. 
2. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, 
submitted that no prejudice has been shown by the appellant 
and in any event there is no absolute bar on the Court to 
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adopting warrant procedure in a given case. 
3. Section 16-A of the Act reads as follows: 
"16-A. Power of Court to try cases summarily. -
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of 
c 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2of1974), all offences under 
sub-section (1) of Sec.16 shall be tried in a summary way 
by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially 
empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by 
a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sec. 262 
D 
to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as 
may be, apply to such trial: 
Provided that In the case of any conviction in a 
summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the 
Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term 
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not exceeding one year : 
Provided further that when at the commencement of, 
or in the course of a summary trial under this section, It 
appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is 
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such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other 
reason, undesirable to try the case summarily the 
Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order 
to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may 
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have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the 
case in the manner provided by the said Code." 
4. From the order of the trial Court it is clear that the case 
was proceeded in the manner provided for trial of warrant cases 
and the prosecution was directed to lead pre charge evidence 
H and such evidence was led. At no stage there was any 
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RADHEY SHYAM AGGARWAL v. STATE N.C.T. 
967 
DELHI [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) 
#-f.. 
challenge to the procedure adopted. In fact second proviso to 
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Section 16-A permits such a course to be adopted. 
5. It is the case of the appellant that the Magistrate had 
not heard the parties and/or recorded an order to the effect that 
the case was such that sentence of imprisonment for a term 
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exceeding one year may have to be passed. 
6. As noted above, this was not the case of the appellant 
at any stage and for the first time in the Special Leave Petition 
such a stand was taken. 
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7. Additionally, as rightly contended by learned counsel for 
the State no prejudice has been shown. In that view of the matter 
we are not inclined to accept the stand that there was any 
violation of the requirements of Section 16-A of the Act. 
However, we find that the occurrence took place nearly two 
D 
decades back and the infractions related to a small quantity of 
'lal mirch'. The sentence imposed is 15 months. It is accepted 
that the appellant has already suffered custody for more than a 
year. That being so, in the peculiar circumstances of the case 
we reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. Bail 
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bonds executed for giving effect to the order for bail dated 
11.2.2002 shall stand discharged.
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