RACHAKONDA VENKAT RAO AND ORS. versus R. SATYA BAI (D) BY LR. AND ANR.

Citation: [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 629 · Decided: 11-09-2003 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: BRIJESH KUMAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Judgment (excerpt)

RACHAKONDA VEN KAT RAO AND ORS. 
v. 
R. SATY A BAI (D) BY LR. AND ANR. 
SEPTEMBER I 1, 2003 
[BRIJESH KUMAR AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.] 
Code of Civil Procedure-Section 2(2)-Decree-Preliminary and 
Final Decree-Difference between-Suit for partition-Compromise 
between parties regarding partition of joint properties-Some properties 
kept joint by consent of parties-Joint application by the parties for decree 
in terms of the compromise-Decree passed putting parties in possession 
of their respective shares-Held, decree is final even though some properties 
remained joint-Code of Civil Procedure-Order XXVJ-Rules 13 and 14. 
The Respondents filed a suit for partition of joint family properties. 
A 
B 
c 
During the pendency of the suit the parties thereto entered into a D 
compromise partitioning the suit properties and putting themselves in 
possession of their respective shares. Few of the properties falling in 
the share of the respondents were left joint in the compromise. The 
parties jointly applied to the Court for passing a decree in terms of the 
compromise. The Court passed a decree on 13th July 1978 on the basis E 
of the compromise. 
In 1991, the respondents filed an application under Order XXVI 
Rules 13 and 14 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
claiming that the decree dated 13th July 1978 left some properties as 
joint. The respondents prayed for appointment of a Commissioner for F 
partitioning the properties by metes and bounds. The trial court 
dismissed the application of the appellants. 
The respondents filed a revision petition before the High Court 
which was allowed by the High Court treating the decree dated 13th G 
July 1978 to be only a preliminary decree. 
In appeal to this Court, the respondents argued that the decree 
dated 13th July 1978 was partly final and partly preliminary as some 
of the properties had not been partitioned. Allowing the appeal and 
setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court, the Court H 
629 
630 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A 
HELD: 1. The tenor of the entire compromise application clearly 
indicates that the parties settled the entire controversy in the suit and 
reached a compromise with respect thereto. For all practical purposes, 
there was a complete partition of the suit properties. The compromise 
shows that the partition of the suit properties in this manner was 
acceptable to the parties, that is why they moved the joint compromise 
B application and prayed for decree in terms thereof. The compromise 
application further records the fact that parties accepted that they had 
been put in possession of their respective share ofimmovable properties. 
The admission on the part of the parties including the respondents 
leaves no scope for argument that the decree dated 13th July 1978 was 
only a preliminary decree and a final decree was yet to be passed. The 
C trial court also proceeded on the basis that it was finally disposing of the 
suit by recording a compromise between the parties with respect to 
subject matter .of the suit. When parties have been put in possession of 
their respective shares of immovable properties by way of decree dated 
13th July 1978, nothing remains for the final decree proceedings. 
D 
[639-D, E, 639-G, H, 640-A-B) 
2. In a partition suit, a court is required to define the shares of 
the parties, identify the joint properties which are to be partitioned, 
allocate properties to parties as per their respective shares and put the 
E parties in possession of the properties allocated to them. All this 
happened with agreement of parties when the Court passed the decree 
on 13th July 1978. No step is missing in those proceedings. Therefore, 
nothing remained to be done. [641-C, DJ 
3. In the partition it is not necessary that each and every property 
F must be partitioned and that the parties are put in separate possession 
of respective portions of the properties falling to their share. In the 
present case, the parties mutually agreed to keep some of the properties 
joint. The properties which were kept joint were in a state that a 
partition by metes and bounds was not possible. Having agreed to keep 
G the properties joint and having had the suit finally disposed of as per 
prayer made to the court, it did not lie in the mouth of the respondents 
to ask for final decree proceedings again and to re-open the partition. 
The only course open to the respondents in such a case would be to 
file a fre

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