R. VENKATASWAMI NAIDU AND ANOTHER versus NARASRAM NARAINDAS

Citation: [1966] 1 S.C.R. 110 · Decided: 27-04-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.K. SARKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

I I 0 
R. VENKATASWAMI NAIDU AND ANOTHER 
v. 
NARASRAM NARAINDAS 
April 27, 1965 
[A. K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAo, M. HIDAYATULLAll AND 
]. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) 
MadrM City Tenants Protection Act, 1922, "· 2(4), 3, 9 and 12-
Tenants building on land in breach of covenant whether entitled to il.tM-
{iJs under ss. 3 and 9. 
The appellants were tellllots who held over after the expiry of their 
lcale aqd !milt structures on the land in breach of a covenant not to 
build. In a suit for their ejectment they aslr.ed the Court to direct the 
landlord to sell the land to them under s. 9 of the Madras City Tenants 
Protection Act, 1922 which had, pending th~ suit, been extended to the 
area. The benefit under s. 9 was available to tenants who were entitled 
under s. 3 to compensation for their structures. According to s. 3 every 
tenant would on e;ectment be entitled to be paid as compensation tho 
value of any buildmg whi~b may 
have been 
erected by him. The 
appellant's claim to the benefit under s. 9 
was accepted 
by the trial 
Court, the first appellate Court and a single Judge of the High Court. 
But in the Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench took the view that 
aince a covenant not to build is enforceable in law and a superstructure 
in contravention of it is liable to be demolished it would be anomalous 
to compensate the tenant under s. 3 for such a structure, and therdore 
1. 3 could not be applicable to tenants who built structures in breach ol 
their covenant. 
It also took note of the words in the preamble that the 
Act was intended to protect tenants who had constructed buildings on 
olhers land& "in the hope that they would not be evicted.'' 
HELD : ( i) The covenant entered into by the tenants could not be 
taken into account for the purpose of construing the scope of s. 3. The 
HiBI> Court had fallen into this error. [l 15F] 
B 
c 
D 
(ii) The word 'tenant" in s. 3 must be understood only in the sense 
"f 
that the word is defined in the Act There is no reason for saying that 
the word 'tenant' in s. 3 excludes tenants who put up structures on the 
land in breach of a covenant not to build. (114 C-DJ 
(iii) A covenant not to buid, if it could affect the right of the tenant 
to claim compensation under s. 3, would be of no effect for under s. 12 
nothing in any contract shall take away a tenant's rights under the Act 
Therefore in spite of the covenant the tenanta were entitled to their righll 
G 
under s. 3 and s. 9. (114 F-0] 
(iv) Since the language of s. 2(4) and ss. 3 and 9 w~ clear ~d 
unambiguous there was no need to resort to the preamble for mterpret101 
these scction9. A preambl£ cannot operate to annul a secllon. [ 115 C·D] 
"N. Vajrapani Naidu v. New Theatre Carnatlc 
Talkies Lid., A:.I.ll. 
( 1964) S.C. 1440, refcned to. 
H 
Per Hidayatullab, J. (i) Section 3 is general and applies to cv~ry 
tenant and would include all and sundry tenants as also tenants holding 
<1Ver. [1170] 
• 
• 
• 
• 
R. v. NAIDU v. NARAINDAS (Sarkar, J.) 
111 
A 
(ii) The kind of building hinted at in the preamble 
namely, one 
constructed "in the hope" of the continuance of the tenancy does ilot 
find any mentipn in the operative part of the Act or in the defini.tiion 
of building. It is therefore difficult to read this limitation (as. was con-
tended) i)l ss. 3. and 9 where 'building' is used without any qualification 
and implies only a construction. [118 F-0) 
B 
c 
Deo v, Brandling, (1828) 7 B & C, 643, referred to. 
(iii) Sections 3 and 9 are imperative and s. 9 is expressly made appli-
cable to pending suits in cjcctment such as the present one. 
Appellants 
made application undeir s. 9 within 
the 
time limited therefor. 
The 
result must obviously follow unless the latter part of s. 12 could save the 
respondent. That could only be if the stipulations by the tenant not to 
build had been 'in writing registered', but the lease-deed in 
question, 
though in writing, is not registered. [119 B.C] 
. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 146 of 
1965. 
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 21, 
1962 of the Madras High Court in L.P.A. No. 29 of 1961. 
D 
P. Ram Redd,v and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants. 
C. B. Agarwala and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents. 
The Judgment of Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ. was 
delivered by Sarkar J. Hidayatullah J. delivered a separate Opinion. 
E 
Sarkar J. 
By an unregistered instrument of lease dated 
February 3, 1953, the respondent let out a pi

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