LexR. S. PANDIT versus STATE OF BIHAR
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1962 P}i::er (P) Ltd. JJomhay v. 17u worl.:eme1J Gajendragadkar, J, 1962 652 SUPRJ<:ME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. holidays which are granted by the appellant to the respondents should be reduced from those sanctioned under the Negotiable Instruments Act to 16 every year. The result is, both the appeals are allowed. Appeal No, 625 of 1962 succeeds and the change proposed to be made by the appellant according to the notice of change served by it on the respondents is allowed to be made, subject to the decision of the Tribunal on the question. remitted to it. Appeal No.626of1962 is also substantially allowed and the number of paid holidays in a year is raised from 10 to 16. In the circumstances of this case, there would be no order as to costs. A ppeala aUowed. R. S. PANDIT "· STATE OF BIHAR (S. J. IMAM, K. SUBBA RAo, N: RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR andj. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Sanction for prosecution-Validity a/- Defective charge-Particulars of person.• from whom bribes taktn not mentioned-Point not mentioned in courts below, not also menlioned in special leave petition or statement of C01Je- Not allowed to be raised-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II), BB. 5, 6-Conatitution of buUa,Art.136. The appellant was convicted under sub.section (I) read with sub-section (3) of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1~)47, ancl sentenced to rigoro11~ imprisonment for thrf"..e years. The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentences -· 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 653 passed on him. He came to this court by special leave. It was contended that the mnction given by the Government for his prosecution was illegal on the ground that the sanctioning authority had not before it all the relevant facts constituting the offence for which •anction was asked for before giving it, the sanction was givtn for prosecuting the appellant under sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3) but he was convic.tcd for a different offence under sub-section (1) of s. 5 read with sub-section (3) and the sanction was given under sub-section (3) of s. 5 which lays down only a rule of evidence on a wrong assumption that the said sub-section created an offence. It was also contended that the charge was defective o.s it did not disclose the amounts appellant had taken as bribes and also persons from whom he had taken them. On account of this, the appellant was not given an opportunity to prove his in- nocence. Htld, that there wa5 no merit in the contention of the appellant that sanction was invalid. The orde1s issued by the government show that the sanction for prosecution was given after considering all the relevant facts necessary to satis- fy the mind of the sanctioning authority. The first informa- tion report and the letter of the Superintendent of Police gave all the necessuy facts to satisfy the mind of the sanctioning authority that the appellant was habitua Uy receiving gratifica- tion other than legal gratification and by cormpt and illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, he had obtained for ' himself pecuniary advantage within the meaning of s. 5 (1) (d) of the Act. The conten- tion of the appellant that sanction was given under s. 5 (2) and not under s. 5 (1) is based upon a misapprehension of the scope of the said sub-sections. Although the sanction refers . to sub-section (2), in effect it must be deemed to relate to sub- section ( 1) read with the sub-section (2), ber.ause the expression ucriminal miscondurt" in sub-section (2) takes in the defini .. tion of criminal miscondui:t. The third contention is also basec! on a n1isrca<ling of the sanction. The sanction was given under sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3) nf s. 5 of the Act. The phraseology used indicates the consciousness on the part of the sanctioning authority that sub-section (3) is not a separate offence but is only a supporting provision to the substantive offence, under sub-section ( 1) and (2). Sub-section (3) does not create a separate offence. It only lays down a rule of evidence; It marks a departure from the. well-established principle of criminal jurisprudence that onus is always on the prO!lecution to bring home the guilt to the accused. When sanction is given nduer sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3), it only means 1962 R. S. Pandit .. Statr of Riliar 1962 R.S. Pandit v. Sta11 ef Bilw 654 SUPREME COURT REPOR
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