R. S. MADANAPPA AND ORS. versus CHANDRAMMA AND ANR.
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A B c D E F G H 283 R. S. MADANAPPA AND ORS. v. CHANDRAMMA AND ANR. March 5, 1965 [K. N. WANCHOO, J. R. MUDHOLKAR ANDS. M. SncRJ, JJ.] Indian Evidence, s. 115 and Equitable Estoppel-When conduct does not amount to estoppel-Mesne profits-Past and future-When can be awarded. . The plaintiff instituted the suit for possession of her half share in the suit properties anci for mesne profits. The first defendant, what was the plaintiff's sister, admitted the plaintiff's ciaim and herselfi claimed a decree against the other defendants in respect of her half share in the suit properties. The second defendant was their fatheJ' and the suit properties were in his possession. He and the other defendants, who were his second wife and children by her, contested the suit. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's claim, but held that the first defendant was estopped from claiming possession of her share. On appeal by the first defendant, the High Court passed .a decree! in her favour also for possession of her half share in the suit proper- ties, and for past and future mesne profits. On appeal to thi~ Court against the decree in favour of the first defendant, it was contended on behalf of the other defen- dants: (i) that the first defendant was estopped by her conduct from claiming possession of her half share of the properties because (a) she\ had not replied to a notice from the plaintiff to join with her in the suit for obtaining possession and division of the suit properties; (b)' she had written a letter to her step-mother stating that she wished to have no interest in the suit properties then in her father's possession; (c) she and her husband had attested a will executed by the father on 25-1-1941 which covered the disposition of the suit properties; and (d) that the first defendant's conduct was either covered by s. 115 Evi- dence Act or fell within the principle of "equitable estoppel"; (jjy even if the first defendant's claim to the half share in the suit pro- perties could not be denied, she must be made to pay for half the cos~ of various improvements of those properties effected by the secondi defendant in the bona fide belief that the properties belonged to him, as she had acquiesced in the expenditure being incurred; (iii) that no decree can be passed in favour of a defendant who has not asked for transposition as plaintiff in the suit; and (iv) that it is not open to a1 court to award future mesne profits to a party who did not claim them in the suit. HELD: (i) The first defendant was neither estopped from claimΒ· ing possession of her half share of the properties nor could she be made liable to pay half the costs of improvements alleged to have been made by the second defendant; (a) It cannot be implied from the conduct of the first defendant in not replying to the notice given by the plaintiff that she had admitted that she had no interest in the properties; (bl The second defendant's case that the properties belong- ed to him having been negatived, there was no possibility of an erroneous belief being created in the mind of the second defendant that he had title to the property because of what the first defendant had sa'd in her letter to her step-mother; (c) The attestation of the will by the first defendant and her husband, by which the second defendant purported to make a disposition of the suit properties in favour of the other defendants could not operate as an estoppel, as 284 StJPREME COURT REPORTS [1965) 3 S.C.R. no interest had accrued in favour of those defendants on the date of the suit. As β’far a~ .the second defendant was concerned, he knew the true legal pos1t10n and could not say that an erroneous belief was created m his mmd by reason of the first defendant and her husband attesting the will. [286 G-H; 287 C; 287 F] Quaere: Whether the Court, while determining whether the conduct of a particular party amounts to an "equitable estoppel" could travel beyond the provisions of s. 115 of the Evidence Act [288 Bl . Case Jaw reviewed. (ii) No man who knowing fully well that he has no title to pro~ perty, spends money on improving it, can be permitted to claim pay~ ment for improvements which were not effected with the consent of the true owner. [290 CJ Ramsden v. Dyson, L R.I.H.L.App. 129, 140 distinguished. (iii) Both the plaintiff and the first defendant claimed under the same title and though the other defendants had urged
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