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R. S. MADANAPPA AND ORS. versus CHANDRAMMA AND ANR.

Citation: [1965] 3 S.C.R. 283 · Decided: 05-03-1965 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K.N. WANCHOO · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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283 
R. S. MADANAPPA AND ORS. 
v. 
CHANDRAMMA AND ANR. 
March 5, 1965 
[K. N. WANCHOO, J. R. MUDHOLKAR ANDS. M. SncRJ, JJ.] 
Indian Evidence, s. 115 and Equitable Estoppel-When conduct 
does not amount to estoppel-Mesne profits-Past and future-When 
can be awarded. 
. 
The plaintiff instituted the suit for possession of her half share in 
the suit properties anci for mesne profits. The first defendant, what 
was the plaintiff's sister, admitted the plaintiff's ciaim and herselfi 
claimed a decree against the other defendants in respect of her half 
share in the suit properties. The second defendant was their fatheJ' 
and the suit properties were in his possession. He and the other 
defendants, who were his second wife and children by her, contested 
the suit. The trial court decreed the plaintiff's claim, but held that 
the first defendant was estopped from claiming possession of her 
share. On appeal by the first defendant, the High Court passed .a decree! 
in her favour also for possession of her half share in the suit proper-
ties, and for past and future mesne profits. 
On appeal to thi~ Court against the decree in favour of the 
first defendant, it was contended on behalf of the other defen-
dants: (i) that the first defendant was estopped by her conduct from 
claiming possession of her half share of the properties because (a) she\ 
had not replied to a notice from the plaintiff to join with her in the 
suit for obtaining possession and division of the suit properties; (b)' 
she had written a letter to her step-mother stating that she wished to 
have no interest in the suit properties then in her father's possession; 
(c) she and her husband had attested a will executed by the father on 
25-1-1941 which covered the disposition of the suit properties; and (d) 
that the first defendant's conduct was either covered by s. 115 Evi-
dence Act or fell within the principle of "equitable estoppel"; (jjy 
even if the first defendant's claim to the half share in the suit pro-
perties could not be denied, she must be made to pay for half the cos~ 
of various improvements of those properties effected by the secondi 
defendant in the bona fide belief that the properties belonged to him, 
as she had acquiesced in the expenditure being incurred; (iii) that no 
decree can be passed in favour of a defendant who has not asked for 
transposition as plaintiff in the suit; and (iv) that it is not open to a1 
court to award future mesne profits to a party who did not claim them 
in the suit. 
HELD: (i) The first defendant was neither estopped from claimΒ· 
ing possession of her half share of the properties nor could she be 
made liable to pay half the costs of improvements alleged to have 
been made by the second defendant; (a) It cannot be implied from 
the conduct of the first defendant in not replying to the notice given 
by the plaintiff that she had admitted that she had no interest in the 
properties; (bl The second defendant's case that the properties belong-
ed to him having been negatived, there was no possibility of an 
erroneous belief being created in the mind of the second defendant 
that he had title to the property because of what the first defendant 
had sa'd in her letter to her step-mother; (c) The attestation of the 
will by the first defendant and her husband, by which the second 
defendant purported to make a disposition of the suit properties in 
favour of the other defendants could not operate as an estoppel, as 
284 
StJPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1965) 3 S.C.R. 
no interest had accrued in favour of those defendants on the date of 
the suit. As β€’far a~ .the second defendant was concerned, he knew 
the true legal pos1t10n and could not say that an erroneous belief 
was created m his mmd by reason of the first defendant and her 
husband attesting the will. [286 G-H; 287 C; 287 F] 
Quaere: Whether the Court, while determining whether the 
conduct of a particular party amounts to an "equitable estoppel" 
could travel beyond the provisions of s. 115 of the Evidence Act 
[288 Bl 
. 
Case Jaw reviewed. 
(ii) No man who knowing fully well that he has no title to pro~ 
perty, spends money on improving it, can be permitted to claim pay~ 
ment for improvements which were not effected with the consent of 
the true owner. [290 CJ 
Ramsden v. Dyson, L R.I.H.L.App. 129, 140 distinguished. 
(iii) Both the plaintiff and the first defendant claimed under the 
same title and though the other defendants had urged 

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