LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

R. RAMACHANDRAN A YYAR 10-08-1962 versus RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR

Citation: [1963] 3 S.C.R. 604 · Decided: 10-08-1962 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 5 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

1961 
AUfU3111. 
604 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] 
R. RAMACHANDRAN A YYAR 
v. 
RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR 
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA, 
. 
and J. R. MuoHoLKAR, JJ.) 
Second Appeal-Interference by High 
Oovrt-Finding 
of foot-Substantial error or defect of procedure-What is-
<Jode ofOivil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), 
s. JOO. 
There was a partnership between the two appellants 
and the father of the respondents Nos. I and 2 who died in 1936. 
In 1938 respondent No. 2 executed a release deed in favour 
of the the appellants whereunder the appellants agreed to pay 
a sum of money to respo:idens Nos. I and 2 in lieu of the share 
of their father. 
Subsequently, respondent No. I filed a suit 
for setting aside the release deed and for accounts. The main 
questions that arose for 
d~cision were whether the release 
deed was justified by adequate consideration, whether respon· 
dent No. 2 had independent advice at the time when he signed 
the deed and whether he acted bonafide or he was imposed 
upon. The trial Court decreed the suit but on appeal the 
first appellate court dismissed the suit. 
In second appeal 
the High Court upset the findings of the first appellate court 
and restored the decree of the trial ~ourt. The appellants 
contended that the High Court had no juri&diction to interfere 
in second appeal as the question involved was one of fact. The 
respondents contended that the High Court was competent to 
interfere as there was a substantial· defect of procedure com. 
mittcd by the first appellate court in that it did not deal with 
all the reasons given by the trial court
1and it did not come to 
close quarters with the judgment of the trial court. 
Held, that the High Court was not justified in interfering 
with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court 
in favour of the appellants. 
There is no jurisdiction to enter-
tain a secon.d 
appeal on the ground 
of an erroneeus 
finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may 
seem to be. To enable the High Court to interfere under 
s. lOO(l)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure there must be a 
substantial error or defect in the procedure which may possi-
bly have produced error or defect in decision of the case upon 
.the merits; it is not enough that there is an error or defect in 
the appreciation of evidence. Even where the appreciation 
a s.c.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
605 
or evidence made by the first appellate court is patently erro-
neous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly 
erroneous, it cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or 
defect in procedure. In the presnt case, the High Court was not 
entitled to interfere merely because judgment of the first app-
ellate court was not as elaborate as that of the trial court or 
because some of the reasons given by the trial court had not 
been expressly reversed by the first appellate court. The que-
stions which arose for decision were pure questions of fact and 
their decision depended upon the appreciation of the evidence 
and circumstances of the case. The findings on these questions 
given by the first appellate court were binding on the High 
Court. The broad features of the evidence supported the con-
clusions of the first appellate court and it could not be conten-
ded that its finding was perverse or was not supported by any 
evidence. 
:.~ 
Mst. Durga Ohoudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Ohoudhri (1890) 
L. R. 17 I. A. 122, relied on. 
Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Brojendra Kishore Rao 
Ohowdry, (1890) L.R. 17 I.A. 65, Shivabasava Kom Amingavda 
v; Sangappa Bin Amingavda,( 1904) L. R. 31 I. A. 154 and 
Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy 
Bahadur, (1906) XVI M.L.J.R. 272, referred to. 
Mangumma v. Paidayya. (1940) 53 L. W. 160, disappro· 
ved. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTIONi Civil AppeaJ 
No. 284/59. 
Appeal by special leave from the judgment 
and decree dated March 16, 1956, of the Madras 
High Court in S. A. No. 436 of 1953. 
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and 
G. GopalakriBhnan, for the appellants. 
N. O. Chatterjee, B. N. Kirpal, Bisharribar Lal 
and Ganpat Rai, for the respondents. 
1962. August 10. 
The Judgment of the court 
was delivered by 
1962 
R. R.m.cfulnil1an 
.Ayya1 
v. 
Ramalin,ram Ohellior 
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J._;This a.ppea.l by special 
Gajendragadkar J, 
Je~ve raises the old familiar •question about the 
1962 
B. · Ramachani:lran 
4.,Jyar 
v. 
Ramalingam. 
Chettiar 
606 
SNPREME GOBRT REPORTS [1963

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.